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Focusing Presidential Clemency
Decision-Making
PAUL J. LARKIN, JR.†
ABSTRACT
The Article II Pardon Clause grants the President
authority to award clemency to any offender. The clause
contains only two limitations. The President cannot excuse
someone from responsibility for a state offense, nor can he
prevent Congress from impeaching and removing a federal
official. Otherwise, the President’s authority is plenary. The
clause authorizes the President to grant clemency as he sees
fit, but the clause does not tell him when he should feel that
way.
Historically, Presidents have generally used their
authority for legitimate reasons, such as freeing someone who
was wrongfully convicted, who is suffering under an unduly
†John, Barbara & Victoria Rumpel Senior Legal Research Fellow, The Heritage
Foundation; M.P.P. George Washington University, 2010; J.D. Stanford Law
School, 1980; B.A. Washington & Lee University, 1977. The views expressed in
this Article are the author’s own and should not be construed as representing any
official position of The Heritage Foundation. I am grateful to Albert W. Alschuler,
Rachel E. Barkow, Megan Cairns, GianCarlo Canaparo, Jeffrey Crouch, Roy T.
Englert, Alex Kozinski, Margaret Colgate Love, John G. Malcolm, Stephen
Marzen, Mark Osler, Ellen S. Podgor, Caleb Redmond, and Zack Smith for helpful
comments on an earlier iteration of this Article. Cooper Conway, Lucas Drill, and
Alexis Huggins provided invaluable research assistance. Any errors are mine.
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onerous punishment, or who deserves to be forgiven.
Nevertheless, no President—nor the Department of Justice
Pardon Attorney, who is ostensibly responsible for managing
the clemency process—has ever recommended a rigorous
standard for use when making clemency decisions. The
Pardon Attorney has compiled a list of relevant factors, which
is quite useful, but that list does not identify which factors are
necessary and sufficient, nor does it assign those factors
particular weights or an ordinal relationship. The result is
that a President is left to act like a chancellor in equity by
relying on his subjective assessment of the “totality of the
circumstances.”
This Article offers a way to make clemency decisions in a
reasonable, orderly manner that would systematize and
regularize the Pardon Attorney’s recommendation process
and
presidential
decision-making.
Pardons
and
commutations differ from each other in material ways, and
Presidents should analyze them separately. In the case of
pardons, Presidents should answer a series of questions—an
algorithm, if you will—that would guide them when deciding
whether to forgive an offender. In the case of commutations,
Presidents should make decisions on a category-by-category
basis, rather than try, in effect, to resentence each offender.
Together, those approaches would help Presidents make
objectively based decisions that are consistent with
longstanding rationales for punishment and the purposes of
the criminal justice system. The hope is that, in so doing,
Presidents will be able act justly and persuade the public that
the clemency system is open to all, not merely to the
President’s financial or political allies, cronies, supporters, or
friends. The focused approaches suggested here should help
Presidents create the fact and appearance of objectivity in
clemency decision-making.
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INTRODUCTION
Throughout history, every polity has used a penal code
to prevent, as Thomas Hobbes put it, bellum omnium contra
omnes—“the war of all against all.” 1 At the same time,
nations have traditionally recognized a need for a
mechanism to correct the mistaken conviction of an innocent
party or the imposition of an unjust punishment.
Historically, that tool has been executive clemency. 2 The
1. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 80 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett Publ’g Co.
1994) (1651).
2. Formal recognition of executive clemency dates to the Code of Hammurabi
in Mesopotamia, one of the earliest legal codes. JEFFREY P. CROUCH, THE
PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER 10–11 (2009). Greek and Roman rulers exercised
that power. See generally, e.g., DAVID KONSTAN, BEFORE FORGIVENESS: THE
ORIGINS OF A MODERN IDEA (2010); MELISSA BARDEN DOWLING, CLEMENCY AND
CRUELTY IN THE ROMAN WORLD (2006); CHARLES L. GRISWOLD, ANCIENT
FORGIVENESS: CLASSICAL, JUDAIC, AND CHRISTIAN (2011); Adriaan Lanni,
Transitional Justice in Ancient Athens, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 551 (2010). The
earliest English, Scottish, and Irish kings did too. See, e.g., ROBERT KELHAM, THE
LAWS OF WILLIAM THE CONQUEROR 63–65, 86, 88 (2010) (1799); A.J. ROBERTSON,
THE LAWS OF THE KINGS OF ENGLAND FROM EDMUND TO HENRY I, at 205 (Reissue
ed. 2009) (1925). See generally NAOMI D. HURNAND, THE KING’S PARDON FOR
HOMICIDE BEFORE AD 1307 (1969). The English Crown has regularly exercised
the clemency power since then. See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *389–402 (William Draper Lewis ed., Philadelphia,
Rees Welsh & Co. 1902) (1769); EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES
OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND 233 (William S. Hein Co. 1986) (1642). See generally
DANIEL DEFOE, A HISTORY OF THE CLEMENCY OF OUR ENGLISH MONARCHS: FROM
THE REFORMATION, DOWN TO THE PRESENT TIME (2013) (1717); CECIL R. HEWITT,
THE QUEEN’S PARDON (1978); K.J. KESSELRING, MERCY AND AUTHORITY IN THE
TUDOR STATE (2003); HELEN LACEY, THE ROYAL PARDON: ACCESS TO MERCY IN
FOURTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (2009); Stanley Grupp, Some Historical Aspects
of the Pardon in England, 7 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 51 (1963); Thomas J. McSweeney,
The King’s Courts and the King’s Soul: Pardoning as Almsgiving in Medieval
England, 40 READING MEDIEVAL STUD. 159 (2014).
The Crown delegated similar authority to the proprietor, the chief executive
official, or the royal governor in the other colonies. DOUGLAS GREENBERG, CRIME
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE COLONY OF NEW YORK, 1691–1776, at 127–32
(1974); HUGH RANKIN, CRIMINAL TRIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE GENERAL COURT OF
COLONIAL VIRGINIA 109–13 (1965); William F. Duker, The President’s Power to
Pardon: A Constitutional History, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 498–500 (1977).
After the Revolution, state legislatures often shared the clemency power with
governors or controlled its exercise. Today, governors generally have the same
plenary authority with regard state offenses as the President enjoys with respect
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constitutions of every state and most foreign nations
authorize some agency to award it, 3 and the Pardon Clause
of the US Constitution vests that power in the President. 4
From the time that George Washington first held that office
until recently, Presidents have regularly exercised their
clemency power. 5
Clemency has become an important public policy issue
over the last few years. One reason is that contemporary
criticisms of the federal criminal justice system have largely
focused on the punitive nature of federal criminal statutes
that went on the books over the last five decades. 6 The
federal drug laws have faced particular condemnation. By
tying the length of an offender’s sentence to the amount of
the controlled substance he or his co-conspirators sold or
to federal offenses, but a few can grant relief only upon an affirmative
recommendation from a state board. See infra note 62.
3. See, e.g., CHRISTIN JENSEN, THE PARDONING POWER IN THE AMERICAN
STATES (1922); ANDREW NOVAK, COMPARATIVE EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PARDON POWER AND THE PREROGATIVE OF MERCY IN GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE (2015).
4. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President . . . shall have Power to grant
Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of
Impeachment.”). Unless the context specifies otherwise, I will use the term
“pardon” to refer to any form of clemency.
5. See, e.g., Duker, supra note 2, at 511–16. See generally CROUCH, supra
note 2; Margaret C. Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, 100 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1169 (2010) [hereinafter Love, Pardon Twilight]. Recently,
Presidents have granted clemency either during the Christmas period or their
last year in office. P.S. Ruckman Jr., Preparing the Pardon Power for the 21st
Century, 12 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 446, 470 (2016) [hereinafter Ruckman, 21st
Century]; P.S. Ruckman, Jr., Seasonal Clemency Revisited: An Empirical
Analysis, 11 WHITE HOUSE STUD. 21, 27 (2011) [hereinafter Ruckman, Seasonal
Clemency] (both noting that a majority of presidential clemency grants over
almost the preceding forty years have been in the month of December or in the
last year of their term in office); see also Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Revitalizing the
Clemency Process, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 833, 854–55 (2016) [hereinafter
Larkin, Revitalizing Clemency].
6. See generally, e.g., RACHEL BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS: BREAKING THE
CYCLE OF MASS INCARCERATION (2019); MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON
STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS (2015); MONA LYNCH, HARD
BARGAINS: THE COERCIVE POWER OF DRUG LAWS IN FEDERAL COURT (2016); BRUCE
WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2006).
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possessed, those statutes can impose sentences that run for
decades or even life, regardless of the charged conduct. 7
Combined with an aggressive US Department of Justice
policy toward drug-law enforcement, until recently those
laws have contributed to a vast increase in the numbers of
federal prisoners that, along with the increased state prison
population, goes by the sobriquet of “mass incarceration.” 8
Efforts to persuade Congress to soften the rigors of the drug
laws so far have met only limited success. 9 As a result,
individual prisoners, with the encouragement and assistance
of advocates for criminal justice reform, have sought relief
through the clemency process.

7. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207
(1986) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841), became law after the emergence
of “crack” cocaine in the nation’s inner cities. The law imposed a mandatory
minimum penalty on the distribution of crack, and the amount that triggered
that penalty was one hundred times less than the predicate amount of powdered
cocaine. See, e.g., Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Crack Cocaine, Congressional Inaction and
Equal Protection, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 241, 241–42 (2014) [hereinafter
Larkin, Crack Cocaine].
8. See generally, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010). The qualifier “until
recently” is important because the total number of federal state prisoners
declined from 2014 to 2019. E. ANN CARLSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2019 1 (2020) (“The imprisonment rate fell 3%
from 2018 to 2019, and 17% from 2009 to 2019.”); id. at 1–2 (“The total prison
population in the U.S. declined from 1,464,400 at year-end 2018 to 1,430,800 at
year-end 2019, a decrease of 33,600 prisoners. This was the largest absolute
population decline since year-end 2015. The 2% decline in the prison population
marked the fifth consecutive annual decrease of at least 1%. At year-end 2019,
the prison population was the smallest since 2002 (1,440,100) and had declined
11% from its all-time peak of 1,615,500 prisoners in 2009.”). The tide has turned.
9. In 2010, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 and 28
U.S.C.). That law amended the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 and reduced the
100:1 crack cocaine ratio to 18:1, but the statute did not apply retroactively.
President Obama used his clemency power in an attempt to reduce the sentences
of the offenders left stranded by the prospective-only 2010 law. Larkin,
Revitalizing Clemency, supra note 5, at 886–87. Congress made the Fair
Sentencing Act of 2010 retroactive in the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115391, 132 Stat. 519 (2018) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 841). For an excellent discussion
of the provenance of that law, see generally Shon Hopwood, The Effort to Reform
the Federal Criminal Justice System, 128 YALE L.J.F. 791 (2019).
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The federal clemency process is not likely to lead them to
the Promised Land, however, for three reasons. The first one
is that, since 1980, only one President has found clemency a
valuable tool for displaying mercy, softening individual
punishments, or reformulating criminal justice priorities. 10
President Barack Obama was that exception. In his last two
years in office, he commuted the sentences imposed on more
than 1,700 drug offenders. 11 Obama’s actions, however, were
atypical. Neither his four immediate predecessors—Ronald
Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W.
Bush—nor his immediate successor—Donald Trump—used
the clemency power to soften the rigors of the federal
sentencing laws on anything other than a limited, episodic
basis. 12
10. This is a commonly voiced criticism. See, e.g., Paul Rosenzweig,
Reflections on the Atrophying Pardon Power, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 593,
608 (2013). See generally Rachel E. Barkow & Mark Osler, Restructuring
Clemency: The Cost of Ignoring Clemency and a Plan for Renewal, 82 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1 (2015); Larkin, Revitalizing Clemency, supra note 5; Love, Pardon
Twilight, supra note 5.
11. See Barack Obama, Commentary, The President’s Role in Advancing
Criminal Justice Reform, 130 HARV. L. REV. 811, 835–38 (2017). In 2014, Obama
directed the Justice Department to establish the Clemency Initiative 2014 to
review commutation applications and forward cases to him where a sentence was
unjust. Before he left office, Obama commuted the sentences of more than 1,700
prisoners. Some recipients left prison immediately; other prisoners are still in
custody but are scheduled to leave prison earlier than their original sentence
required. For descriptions of that initiative, see generally OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR
GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT’S CLEMENCY INITIATIVE
(2018); U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
CLEMENCY INITIATIVE 2014 (2017). Though well intentioned, President Obama
went about the process in the wrong way. Rather than considering commutation
petitions on a retail basis, Obama should have granted drug offenders a broad,
amnesty-like commutation and let district courts decide what exact term of
imprisonment each offender should serve. See generally Paul J. Larkin, Jr., “A
Day Late and a Dollar Short”: President Obama’s Clemency Initiative 2014, 16
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 147 (2018); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Delegating Clemency, 29
FED. SENT’G REP. 267 (2017) [hereinafter Larkin, Delegating Clemency]. The
Justice Department discontinued the Clemency Initiative 2017 when Donald
Trump became President.
12. For statistics regarding the frequency of clemency grants by those
Presidents, see OFF. OF THE PARDON ATT’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CLEMENCY
STATISTICS, https://www.justice.gov/pardon/clemency-statistics (Oct. 26, 2021).
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The second explanation for clemency’s desuetude is even
more troubling. Historically, Presidents have relied heavily
on the clemency recommendations of the US Department of
Justice. 13 The Department, however, suffers from an actual
or apparent conflict of interest because it successfully
prosecuted every applicant and is unlikely to view clemency
applications neutrally. 14 Yet, no recent President, not even
Obama, has displayed any interest in reforming the federal
clemency process.
There is also a third flaw in the current process, one that
becomes apparent when the President receives a petition: the
President has little guidance as to what he should do with it.
I do not mean that clemency applications go directly from an
offender to a President’s desk without review by a host of
advisors at the Justice Department and White House

13. Particularly the Pardon Attorney, who heads of the Office of Pardon
Attorney, which manages the clemency recommendation process. For discussion
of the operation of the federal clemency process, see Love, Pardon Twilight, supra
note 5, at 1172–1204. See generally Mark Osler, Fewer Hands, More Mercy: A
Plea for a Better Federal Clemency System, 41 VT. L. REV. 465 (2017) [hereinafter
Osler, Fewer Hands, More Mercy].
14. See, e.g., Rosenzweig, supra note 10, at 608 (“[P]rosecutors, relishing their
discretion, are poorly positioned to second-guess their own exercise of that power
through the mechanism of clemency,” so “if you give the prosecutor broad
authority to make decisions, you cannot be surprised when he is impressed with
his own rectitude.”). Numerous commentators have criticized the federal
clemency process on that ground. See, e.g., Barkow & Osler, supra note 10;
Gregory Craig, Couns. to President Obama (2008–2009), Remarks at the
American Constitution Society Conference on Pardons (May 10, 2012),
http://www.propublica.org/documents/item/356129-greg-craigs-remarks-at-theacs-conference-on; Margaret Colgate Love, Justice Department Administration of
the President’s Pardon Power: A Case Study in Institutional Conflict of Interest,
47 U. TOL. L. REV. 89, 90 (2015) [hereinafter Love, DOJ Conflict of Interest];
Samuel Morison, Saving Grace: Salvaging the Pardon Advisory System, AM.
CONST. SOC’Y BLOG (Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/saving-gracesalvaging-the-pardon-advisory-system. Aggravating that problem is that the
Pardon Attorney reports to the Deputy Attorney General, who is responsible for
managing all federal criminal prosecutions by the department or US Attorney’s
Office. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 506–507A (authorizing the President to appoint a deputy
attorney general); id. § 5641 (authorizing the President to appoint a US Attorney
for every judicial district, ninety-three in all).
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Counsel’s Office. 15 Numerous people—far too many,
according to some critics 16—have the opportunity to review,
comment on, or, as a practical matter, torpedo a clemency
application before the President sees it. No, the problem is
that neither American law nor custom has defined an
objective standard or approach that a President should use
once a clemency petition lands on his desk with the advice of
his lieutenants.
How should a President analyze clemency petitions?
What evidence should he consider? What factors? Should he
make a gestalt judgment based on the totality of the
circumstances? Should he define necessary and sufficient
conditions for clemency? Should he rank relevant factors in
an ordinal manner? What weight should he give to the
Justice Department’s recommendations? Does it matter
what supporters say, and who they are, or does that favor the
wealthy and well connected? What about victims’ opinions of
the applicant’s crimes? Should public opinion matter? What
risk of making the wrong decision should the President be
willing to bear (and in which direction)? I could multiply the
questions, but there is no need. Any person worthy of being
President should want to make right decisions, and a
President with any quantum of humility (asking for a normal
amount of humility from someone who becomes President
would be an exercise in futility) should be willing to listen to
advice. The goal of this Article is to offer some
recommendations that Presidents would find useful.
Now is a propitious time for clemency reform. There has
been little slack in the amount of criticism levelled at the

15. Of course, some Presidents, with the help of some government officials,
have allowed applicants to bypass the established clemency process and submit
applications directly to the President. Bill Clinton permitted applicants to endrun the Justice Department, and the pardons that he issued during his last days
in office stand as an example of the mistakes that Presidents make when they
allow that to happen. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Bill Clinton’s Parting Pardon
Party, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1131, 1136–37 (2010).
16. See generally Osler, Fewer Hands, More Mercy, supra note 13.
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number of people held in America’s prisons. The President
could use his clemency power to address that problem with
regard to the federal prison population without the need for
legislation, an undeniable benefit in a time of serious
political polarization. There is a consensus that the clemency
process needs repair, in part because several recent
Presidents have granted relief in questionable cases. 17 A new
administration began in 2021, offering the promise of a
different approach to old problems that still need solving.
Perhaps most important because of its recency is the
widespread criticism that, throughout his time in office,
former President Donald Trump used clemency to advance
his own political interests 18 and, particularly during his final
weeks in office, acted “[l]ike a Borgia pope trading
indulgences as quid pro quos with his corrupt cardinals” 19 by
17. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The Legality of Presidential Self-Pardons, 44
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 763, 764–65 n.3 (2021).
18. As one scholar put it, “‘[o]ther presidents have occasionally issued
abusive, self-serving pardons based on insider connections,’ Harvard Law School
professor Jack Goldsmith, who has tracked Trump’s pardons and commutations,
said via email. ‘Almost all of Trump’s pardons fit that pattern. What other
presidents did exceptionally, Trump does as a matter of course.’” Michael
Kranish, Trump Vowed to Drain the Swamp. Then He Granted Clemency to Three
Former Congressmen Convicted of Federal Crimes., WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-pardon-hunter-collins-stockma
n/2020/12/23/dc2ff8e0-4538-11eb-975c-d17b8815a66d_story.html; see also, e.g.,
Rebecca Ballhaus & Byron Tau, Trump Issues 26 More Pardons, Including to
Paul Manafort, Roger Stone, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 24, 2020, 12:10 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-issues-26-more-pardons-including-to-paulmanafort-roger-stone-11608769926; Editorial Board, Trump Corrupted the
Presidential Pardon. Biden Must Repair It., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/23/opinion/trump-biden-pardon.html; Maggie
Haberman & Michael S. Schmidt, Trump Gives Clemency to More Allies,
Including Manafort, Stone and Charles Kushner, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/23/us/politics/trump-pardon-manafort-stone
.html. Trump also granted clemency infrequently. JOHN GRAMLICH & KRISTEN
BIALIK, PEW RSCH. CTR., SO FAR, TRUMP HAS GRANTED CLEMENCY LESS
FREQUENTLY THAN ANY PRESIDENT IN MODERN HISTORY (2020). Together, those
criticisms bring to mind the old joke about a restaurant’s poor cuisine: the food
doesn’t taste very good, and the portions are too small.
19. Steven G. Calabresi & Norman L. Eisen, The Problem with Trump’s
Odious Pardon of Steve Bannon, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.nytimes
.com/2021/01/20/opinion/trump-bannon-pardon.html.
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rewarding friends and loyalists. 20 Indeed, one commentator
has recommended repealing the Pardon Clause via a
constitutional amendment. 21
President Joe Biden displayed interest in criminal
justice reform during his years in the Senate, having
shepherded through the Senate the Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. 22 He also took a step
20. See, e.g., BOB BAUER & JACK GOLDSMITH, AFTER TRUMP: RECONSTRUCTING
PRESIDENCY 116–25 (2020); Peter Baker, For a Defeated President, Pardons
Are an Expression of Grievance, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes
.com/2020/12/24/us/politics/trump-pardon-power.html; David Cohen, Sen.
Toomey: Trump Going Too Far with Pardons, POLITICO (Dec. 27, 2020, 9:30 AM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/27/toomey-trump-pardons-450759;
Editorial Board, Trump’s Pardons—Good, Bad, and Ugly, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 20,
2021, 6:15 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trumps-pardonsgood-bad-and-ugly11611184527; Editorial Board, Trump Corrupted the Presidential pardon. Biden
Must Repair It., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12
/23/opinion/trump-biden-pardon.html; Jack Goldsmith & Matt Gluck, Trump’s
Circumvention of the Justice Department Clemency Process, LAWFARE (Dec. 29,
2020, 1:49 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/trumps-circumvention-justicedepartment-clemency-process; Maggie Haberman & Michael S. Schmidt, Trump
Gives Clemency to More Allies, Including Manafort, Stone and Charles Kushner,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/23/us/politics
/trump-pardon-manafort-stone.html; Annie Karni, President Trump Grants
Pardon to Conrad Black, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com
/2019/05/15/us/politics/conrad-black-pardon.html; Michael Kranish, Trump
Vowed to Drain the Swamp. Then He Granted Clemency to Three Former
Congressmen Convicted of Federal Crimes. WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-pardon-hunter-collins-stockma
n/2020/12/23/dc2ff8e0-4538-11eb-975c-d17b8815a66d_story.html;
Margaret
Colgate Love, Are Trump’s Pardons a Blessing in Disguise?, LAWFARE (Dec. 29,
2020, 5:17 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/are-trumps-pardons-blessingdisguise; Bernadette Meyler, Trump’s Theater of Pardoning, 72 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 92, 94 (2020); Tim Naftali, Trump’s Pardons Make the Unimaginable
Real, ATLANTIC (Dec. 23, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive
/2020/12/how-abuse-presidential-pardon/617473/; Frances Robles, Outside
Trump’s Inner Circle, Odds Are Long for Getting Clemency, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/28/us/pardons-trump.html;
Paul
Rosenzweig, Trump’s Pardon of Manafort Is the Realization of the Founders’
Fears, ATLANTIC (Dec. 23, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020
/12/problem-pardons-was-clear-start/617397/.
THE

21. Andrew C. McCarthy, Repeal the Pardon Power, NAT’L REV. (Jan. 7, 2021),
https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2021/01/25/repeal-the-pardonpower/.
22. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified as amended at
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toward reform during his first week in office by directing the
Attorney General not to re-sign contracts with private
prisons 23 and does not lack for reform arguments and options
to consider. He might be willing to rethink the entire subject.
To be sure, President Biden has not made clemency
reform an immediate priority. Issues such as deciding on how
to staff up his administration, how to deal with the Covid-19
pandemic, how to respond to the economic dislocation that it
has caused, foreign policy issues, and related subjects have
naturally occupied most of his attention to date. At some
point, however, he will be under pressure from supporters
interested in criminal justice reform to reduce the number of
federal prisoners, and he can do so unilaterally by using his
clemency authority. He could also remedy the flaws afflicting
the clemency system in the hope that his new mechanism
will endure after he leaves office. The result is that he will
need to decide whether to reconsider the clemency process
from scratch, as numerous commentators have argued,
tinker around the edges of the system in place, or just
stumble through in much the same manner as his
predecessors.
Part I will summarize the current difficulty of making
clemency decisions in an objective, even moderately rigorous
manner, because the different potential sources from which
scattered sections of 12, 18 & 42 U.S.C.). Ironically, some commentators have
criticized Biden for his role in seeing to the enactment of that law on the ground
that it became “one of the cornerstone statutes that accelerated mass
incarceration.” Ed Chung et al., The 1994 Crime Bill Continues to Undercut
Justice Reform—Here’s How to Stop It, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 26, 2019),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/criminal-justice/reports/2019/03/26
/467486/1994-crime-bill-continues-undercut-justice-reform-heres-stop/; see also,
e.g., Udi Ofer, How the 1994 Crime Bill Fed the Mass Incarceration Crisis, ACLU
BLOG (June 4, 2019, 2:30 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/smart-justice/massincarceration/how-1994-crime-bill-fed-mass-incarceration-crisis.
Biden
has
walked back from his earlier views. See Rafael A. Mangual, Soft on Crime, CITY
J., Winter 2021, https://www.city-journal.org/biden-soft-on-crime.
23. Reforming Our Incarceration System to Eliminate the Use of Privately
Operated Criminal Detention Facilities, Exec. Order No. 14,006, 86 Fed. Reg.
7,483 (Jan. 29, 2021).
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a President could seek advice unfortunately provide little
assistance. Parts II and III set forth a decision-making
process that the President can use. Part II addresses
pardons. It proposes that the President use a decision-tree
approach. The President should ask a series of questions
when deciding whether to forgive a convicted defendant: Is
he or she innocent, factually, legally, or morally (distinct but
related concepts, as I will explain below)? Has he admitted
his wrongdoing, atoned for any harms he caused, and
undergone metanoia? Would pardoning him bring the
criminal justice system into disrepute? Is there a “reason of
state”—such as a foreign prisoner exchange—that justifies a
pardon? Part III turns to commutations. Deciding whether to
shorten a sentence, and, if so, by how much, is a very
different inquiry from deciding whether to exonerate
someone. With regard to commutations, the President should
make decisions on a category-wide basis rather than a caseby-case basis. For example, he should decide whether to
commute all capital sentences or all sentences of life without
parole, rather than resentence each individual prisoner.
Finally, Part IV addresses the issue whether the President
should have an additional group that I will label
“extraordinary cases”—viz., cases that fall outside of the
questions and categories noted above but have some striking
feature that justifies relief. I think that there should be such
a category. The difficulty is keeping what should be only a
narrow exception from swallowing the rest of the rule and
leading to results that are, or appear to be, entirely arbitrary.
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THE DIFFICULTY OF DECIDING WHEN
TO GRANT CLEMENCY

A. The Text of the Pardon Clause
The Pardon Clause of Article II of the Constitution
provides that “[t]he President . . . shall have Power to grant
Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United
States, except in cases of Impeachment.” 24 The simple text
seems straightforward. Because the Framers knew English
history and the common law, 25 the text strongly suggests the
Framers intended to grant the President the same power
that the Crown could exercise to temporarily stay the
imposition of a punishment (a reprieve) or to completely
excuse someone from all criminal responsibility (a pardon). 26
24. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
25. See, e.g., Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 351, 358 (2015) (“The colonists
brought the principles of Magna Carta with them to the New World . . . .”); Kerry
v. Din, 576 U.S. 86, 91 (2015) (plurality opinion) (“Edward Coke[’s] Institutes
‘were read in the American Colonies by virtually every student of law . . . .’”
(quoting Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 225 (1967)); Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (noting that Blackstone’s “works constituted the
preeminent authority on English law for the founding generation”); BERNARD
BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 30–31 (1992).
That knowledge is particularly important in the case of the Pardon Clause. See
Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 262 (1974) (“The history of our executive pardoning
power reveals a consistent pattern of adherence to the English common-law
practice.”).
26. See, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *397 (“[O]ne of the great
advantages of monarchy in general[,] above any other form of government[, is]
that there is a magistrate who has it in his power to extend mercy wherever he
thinks it is deserved . . . .”); id. at *401 (“[T]he king may extend his mercy upon
what terms he pleases, and may annex to his bounty a condition either precedent
or subsequent, on the performance whereof the validity of the pardon will
depend[,] and this by the common law.”); COKE, supra note 2, at 233 (stating that
the Crown could exercise that prerogative “either before attainder, sentence, or
conviction, or after, [to] forgiveth any crime, offense, punishment, execution,
right, title, debt or duty, temporal or ecclesiastical”); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S.
333, 380–81 (1866) (“A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the
offence and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the
punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the
offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offence. If granted before
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By expressly granting that power to the nation’s chief
executive, the Pardon Clause makes clemency a prerogative
of the office 27 and protects it against restriction by the other
branches (particularly Congress). 28 As the Supreme Court of
the United States summarized in United States v. Klein, “To
the executive alone is intrusted the power of pardon; and it
is granted without limit.” 29
That description, however, is an overstatement. 30 The
conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities consequent upon
conviction from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties
and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were,
a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.”); see also Larkin,
Revitalizing Clemency, supra note 5, at 846–47; cf. SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE
PRAKASH, IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGINNING: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL
EXECUTIVE 153 (2015) (“The absence of an explanation of the [commander-inchief’s] office’s contours suggests that the Framers drew upon prevailing
conceptions of what it meant to be a commander in chief.”).
27. A prerogative, to John Locke’s thinking, was “the Power of doing publick
good without a Rule.” JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, § 166,
at 396 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960) (1689).
28. See, e.g., Schick, 419 U.S. at 266 (“[T]he power flows from the Constitution
alone, not from any legislative enactments, and that it cannot be modified,
abridged, or diminished by the Congress.”); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. at 380
(“The power thus conferred is unlimited, with the exception stated. It extends to
every offence known to the law and may be exercised at any time after its
commission, either before legal proceedings are taken, or during their pendency,
or after conviction and judgment. This power of the President is not subject to
legislative control. Congress can neither limit the effect of his pardon, nor exclude
from its exercise any class of offenders. The benign prerogative of mercy reposed
in him cannot be fettered by any legislative restrictions.”).
29. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1872); see also, e.g., Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S.
180, 187 (2009) (“Federal clemency is exclusively executive: Only the President
has the power to grant clemency for offenses under federal law.”); 2 JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1504, at 324
n.4 (Thomas M. Cooley ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 4th ed. 1873) (1833)
(“Congress cannot limit or impose restrictions on the President’s power to
pardon.”); cf. Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 9 (2011) (The Court, referring to a
governor’s clemency power, stated: “It is not for the Judicial Branch to determine
the standards for this discretion. If the clemency power is exercised in either too
generous or too stingy a way, that calls for political correctives, not judicial
intervention.”).
30. And an understatement. The President can commute a prisoner’s
sentence without pardoning his crime. See, e.g., Schick, 419 U.S. at 260; Biddle
v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 487 (1927).
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text of the Pardon Clause limits the President’s authority in
(at least) two ways. As a recognition of the federalist nature
of our country, the clause allows the President to grant
offenders relief only for federal offenses, leaving the states
free to decide how to punish anyone who violates their own
laws, including whether and when to grant someone
clemency. 31 The President also cannot use his Pardon Clause
power to prevent Congress from exercising its Article I
authority to impeach and remove a federal official from
office. 32 The President can keep an official out of jail, but he
cannot leave him or her in power.
In addition, a few other constitutional provisions are
relevant. 33 The Take Care Clause directs the President to

31. That exception enables a state to treat a pardoned federal crime as a prior
conviction for purposes of a state recidivist statute even though a pardon absolves
an offender from all federal liability. Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S. 51, 59 (1914).
The American colonies and states have always had a clemency power, which has
been lodged, traditionally but not uniformly, in a chief executive. See, e.g.,
GREENBERG, supra note 2, at 127–32; RANKIN, supra note 2, at 109–13; Duker,
supra note 2, at 498–500. See generally JENSEN, supra note 3; WILLIAM WEST
SMITHERS, A TREATISE ON EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY IN PENNSYLVANIA (1909);
CAROLYN STRANGE, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: PARDON AND PAROLE IN NEW YORK
FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE DEPRESSION (2016). For personal reflections on
clemency decisions by some former governors, see EDMUND G. (PAT) BROWN,
PUBLIC JUSTICE, PRIVATE MERCY: A GOVERNOR’S EDUCATION ON DEATH ROW (1989);
Richard F. Celeste, Executive Clemency: One Executive’s Real Life Decisions, 31
CAP. U. L. REV. 139 (2003); Robert L. Ehrlich, Keynote Address, Pardons and
Commutations: Observations from the Front Lines, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 669
(2012); Winthrop Rockefeller, Executive Clemency and the Death Penalty, 21
CATH. U. L. REV. 94 (1971).
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (“The House of Representatives . . . shall have
the sole Power of Impeachment.”); id. § 3, cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the sole
Power to try all Impeachments.”); id. § 3, cl. 7 (“Judgment in Cases of
Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and
disqualification to hold and enjoy and Office of honor, Trust, or Profit under the
United States . . . .”).
33. See Schick, 419 U.S. at 266 (noting that other constitutional provisions
can limit the President’s Pardon Clause authority); cf. Akhil Amar,
Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (1999) (arguing that the Constitution
should be read holistically when construing recurrent or cognate terms in the
Constitution in parallel or related provisions).
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ensure that “the Laws [are] faithfully executed.” 34 Recent
scholarship argues that this clause imposes on the President
fiduciary obligations, which require him to comply with all
constitutional provisions in the federal criminal code. 35 At a
minimum, 36 that responsibility forbids the President from
using his clemency power to commit or cover up a crime. 37
The President also cannot remit a fine or forfeitures of funds
that have been deposited into the federal treasury without

34. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
35. See generally GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, A GREAT POWER OF
ATTORNEY: UNDERSTANDING THE FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION (2017); Andrew Kent et
al., Faithful Execution and Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2111 (2019); Ethan J.
Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Fiduciary Constitutionalism: Implications
for Self-Pardons and Non-Delegation, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 463 (2019). Cf.
Robert G. Natelson, Judicial Review of Special Interest Spending: The General
Welfare Clause and the Fiduciary Law of the Founders, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL.
239 (2007); Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF.
L. REV. 1077 (2004). As is common in public policy, not everyone agrees with that
thesis. See generally, e.g., Samuel L. Bray & Paul B. Miller, Against Fiduciary
Constitutionalism, 106 VA. L. REV. 1479 (2020); John Mikhail, Is the Constitution
a Power of Attorney or a Corporate Charter? A Commentary on “A Great Power of
Attorney”: Understanding the Fiduciary Constitution by Gary Lawson and Guy
Seidman, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 407 (2019); Richard Primus, The Elephant
Problem, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 373 (2019); Suzanna Sherry, The Imaginary
Constitution, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 441 (2019). That debate is interesting,
but not important here.
36. The Take Care Clause might implicitly bar the President from granting
pardons prospectively, at least on a large-scale basis. That is, he might not be able
to immunize a category of people beforehand for committing a federal offense.
Doing so might constitute a “suspension” of the federal criminal law that the Take
Care Clause directs him to enforce and that only Congress can authorize. It is far
from obvious, however, that the Take Care Clause forbids such “anticipatory”
pardons. See infra note 108.
37. Congress could impeach and remove from office a President who sold
commutations, and the Justice Department could prosecute him or her for doing
so. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“The President . . . shall be removed from Office
on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes
and Misdemeanors.”); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (“[T]he Party convicted [by the Senate]
shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial and Punishment,
according to Law.”); cf. United States v. Blanton, 719 F.2d 815, 819 nn.6–7 (6th
Cir. 1983) (en banc) (prosecution of former Tennessee Governor Leonard Ray
Blanton (and others) for mail and tax fraud in connection with the issuance of
retail liquor licenses in which the voir dire revealed news reports that the
governor had also sold pardons). See generally KEEL HUNT, COUP (2013).
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statutory authorization, because the Appropriations Clause
denies the President the right to treat the federal treasury
as his own piggy bank. 38 Other constitutional provisions are
relevant too. The First Amendment, for example, forbids the
President from denying clemency to someone who otherwise
deserves it simply because he or she belongs to a faith
tradition different from his or her own. 39
Otherwise, the Constitution does not constrain the
President. He can use his power for any legitimate reason—
to further justice, to express mercy, to make his opinions
known as to what crimes and offenders should be the focus
of the federal law enforcement agencies, and so forth. He can
also use it for no reason at all and might even be able to grant
clemency for a reason we would find unjustified (at least if
he keeps his mouth shut). In short, the Pardon Clause
empowers the President to grant clemency as he sees fit. The
problem is that it does not tell him when he should feel that
way. 40
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No money shall be drawn from the Treasury,
but in Consequences of Appropriations made by law . . . .”); see Knote v. United
States, 95 U.S. 149, 154–55 (1877); United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.)
531, 543 (1869).
39. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”); Leib &
Shugerman, supra note 35, at 470–71.
40. See, e.g., Paul J. Haase, Note, “Oh My Darling Clemency”: Existing or
Possible Limitations on the Use of the Presidential Pardon Power, 39 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1287, 1293 (2002) (“The language of the Constitution provides no real
guidance regarding the manner in which the appropriateness of a pardon should
be determined.”); Joanna M. Huang, Note, Correcting Mandatory Injustice:
Judicial Recommendation of Executive Clemency, 60 DUKE L.J. 131, 133 (2010)
(“Executive clemency[’s] . . . flexible and broad nature allows the president and
state governors to pardon or commute sentences at will . . . .”); Daniel T. Kobil,
Chance and the Constitution in Capital Clemency Cases, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 567,
567 (2000) (describing clemency as a “largely unprincipled, almost standardless
component in our justice system”); Kathleen Dean Moore, Pardon for Good and
Sufficient Reasons, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 281, 282 (1993) [hereinafter Moore, Good
and Sufficient Reasons] (“[T]he Framers provided no criteria for distinguishing
between proper and improper uses of the pardoning power and put no
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B. Non-Textual Sources of Guidance
If the President were to look elsewhere for guidance, he
would find little. 41 The Supreme Court has discussed
clemency on but a few occasions, 42 and its decisions do not
say much that a President would find helpful. In Herrera v.
Collins, 43 the Court described the pardon power as a “‘fail
safe’ in our criminal justice system”—the “historic remedy for
preventing miscarriages of justice where the judicial process
has been exhausted” but a convicted defendant can prove his
innocence. 44 Proof of innocence has always been the
constitutional limit on the president’s use of that power, except to prohibit
pardons in cases of impeachment.”); Rosenzweig, supra note 10, at 597.
41. For a lengthy discussion of other potential sources, see Paul J. Larkin, Jr.,
Guiding Presidential Clemency Decision Making, 18 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 451
(2020) [hereinafter Larkin, Guiding Clemency]. This section draws on that
treatment.
42. The Pardon Clause has been the subject of relatively few Supreme Court
decisions. For cases discussing issues arising in connection with presidential
clemency, see, for example, Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180 (2009); Schick v. Reed,
419 U.S. 256 (1974); Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480 (1927); Ex parte Grossman,
267 U.S. 87 (1925); Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915); Jenkins v.
Collard, 145 U.S. 546 (1892); Hart v. United States, 118 U.S. 62 (1886); Young v.
United States, 97 U.S. 39 (1877); Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149 (1877);
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872); United States v. Padelford,
76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1869); In re Armstrong’s Foundry, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 766
(1867); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866); Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18
How.) 307 (1855); United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150 (1833). For cases
discussing issues arising in connection with gubernatorial clemency, see, for
example, Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1 (2011); Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v.
Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) (in the
interest of full disclosure, I was one of the lawyers who represented the United
States in Herrera); Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981); Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion); Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S.
9 (1950).
43. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
44. Id. at 411–12, 415 (quoting KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE,
MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 131 (1989)); see also Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S.
163, 193 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Reversal of an erroneous conviction on
appeal or on habeas, or the pardoning of an innocent condemnee through
executive clemency, demonstrates not the failure of the system but its success.
Those devices are part and parcel of the multiple assurances that are applied
before a death sentence is carried out.”); Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 399 (2004)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Among its benign if too-often ignored objects, the
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archetypical case of an injustice that clemency can and
should rectify. 45 A case with irrefutable proof that the
applicant is innocent—perhaps because newly discovered
evidence, such as DNA test results, proves that someone else
committed the crime—is an easy case for a pardon. 46
Yet in Herrera, aside from the fact that defendant could
not establish his own innocence, 47 the Court told the
clemency power can correct injustices that the ordinary criminal process seems
unable or unwilling to consider.”).
45. See, e.g., Herrera, 506 U.S. at 411–12; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 3 ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES: PARDON 73 (1939); EDWIN
MONTEFIORE BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (2012) (1932).
46. Of course, that assumes a prisoner can obtain DNA evidence. A prisoner
has no constitutional right to demand that the government subject evidence to
DNA testing. See Dist. Att’y’s Off. for the Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S.
52, 74–75 (2009) (rejecting that claim). The well-known Innocence Project has
obtained test results for some prisoners, see infra note 80, but its funds only go
so far.
47. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417–19. Leonel Herrera was convicted of murdering
one police officer and pleaded guilty to murdering a second one. One night late in
September 1981, Herrera was transporting marijuana by car. He came across
and killed Texas Department of Public Safety Officer David Rucker on a stretch
of highway about six miles east of Los Fresnos, Texas. Herrera sped away from
the scene of the crime in the direction of Los Fresnos. Unaware of Herrera’s first
murder, Los Fresnos Police Officer Enrique Carrisalez saw Herrera speeding
and, together with his partner, Officer Enrique Hernandez, stopped Herrera.
Officer Carrisalez approach Herrera’s vehicle while Officer Hernandez remained
in the patrol car. As Officer Carrisalez approach Herrera, Herrera opened his
door, exchanged a few words with Carrisalez, and then shot Carrisalez in the
chest. Officer Hernandez witnessed the shooting from their patrol car and
identified Herrera as the slayer. While hospitalized and before succumbing to his
wound, Carrisalez gave a declaration that Herrera had shot him. There was also
physical evidence tying Herrera to the murder. When arrested, Herrera had a
handwritten letter on him strongly suggesting that he was responsible for killing
Rucker. The car Herrera was driving was registered to his “live-in” girlfriend.
Herrera’s Social Security card was found alongside Rucker’s patrol car. Blood
matching Rucker’s type (Type A) and differing from Herrera’s (Type O) was found
on Herrera’s blue jeans and wallet. Id. at 393–95 & n.1. Eight years after his trial
and in his second state habeas corpus petition, Herrera claimed that he was
innocent. To support that claim, Herrera offered “the affidavits of Hector
Villarreal, an attorney who had represented petitioner’s brother, Raul Herrera,
Sr., and of Juan Franco Palacious, one of Raul, Senior’s former cellmates. Both
individuals claimed that Raul, Senior, who died in 1984, had told them that he—
and not [Herrera]—had killed Officers Rucker and Carrisalez.” Id. at 396.
Herrera never explained why he waited so long—and, in particular, until after
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President very little about when he should grant clemency.
Most cases that reach the Oval Office do not involve claims
of innocence. Approximately 97 percent of federal defendants
plead guilty, 48 which, legally speaking, is an admission of the
factual elements of the crime. 49 Cases like Herrera would be
outliers in the federal system. Instead, the petitioner
ordinarily is someone who has completed his sentence and
seeks forgiveness because he has admitted his crime, atoned
for its harms, and turned his life around, or is a prisoner who
asks only that the chief executive lighten the burden of his
sentence. 50 Herrera says nothing about what a President
should do in those cases: ones where the applicant is
indisputably guilty but instead seeks forgiveness or mercy.
Biddle v. Perovich is the only other potentially helpful
Supreme Court decision. 51 Perovich is helpful because it
recharacterized clemency decisions from being an example of
magisterial “grace,” as Chief Justice John Marshall had once
described it, 52 to a far more prosaic judgment that a court’s
the allegedly responsible party had died—before offering his evidence of
innocence. Herrera also never explained why, if he was innocent, he pleaded
guilty to the murder of Officer Rucker. Id. at 417–19.
48. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012).
49. See Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798, 804 (2018) (“The plea of guilty
is, of course, a confession of all the facts charged in the indictment, and also of
the evil intent imputed to the defendant.” (citation omitted)); Menna v. New York,
423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975) (“[A] counseled plea of guilty is an admission of factual
guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it quite validly removes
the issue of factual guilt from the case.”).
50. See, e.g., Love, Pardon Twilight, supra note 5, at 1175–93, 1204–08.
51. 274 U.S. 480 (1927).
52. In the Court’s first discussion of the Pardon Clause, Chief Justice John
Marshall described an award of clemency as “an act of grace, proceeding from the
power intrusted with the execution of the laws,” United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S.
(7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833), a description that the Court has reiterated in more recent
times, see, for example, Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 280–
81 (1998) (plurality opinion). If that description of clemency were correct, then it
would be the President’s prerogative to decide when, to whom, and how to grant
it, and no one could persuasively claim to be entitled to receive it. MOORE, supra
note 44, at 282. Today, however, we disallow the federal government, including
the President, from discriminating against individuals on certain grounds, such
as race, religion, political affiliation, and the like. The Wilson characterization is
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judgment or punishment was unnecessary or excessive. As
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes explained, a pardon is “not a
private act of grace from an individual happening to possess
power,” but “the determination of the ultimate authority that
the public welfare will be better served by inflicting less than
what the judgment fixed.” 53 That is why, as the Court held
in Perovich, an offender cannot refuse a commutation: it is
not a gift he can decline. 54 Holmes’s description, however,
identifies the justification for clemency or a description of
what it entails, not a prerequisite for its grant. Perovich
states the issue posed by every clemency petition, but it does
not help the President decide whether he serves the public
by granting clemency to this applicant. An exhortation to
serve the public is little better than nothing at all.
The Supreme Court’s other Pardon Clause decisions do
not assist a President make individual clemency judgments.
The Court has avoided identifying a useful standard for
clemency decision-making on the ground that it is beyond the
proper role for federal courts. 55 Instead, the Court has
limited itself to using extraordinarily expansive terms to
describe the President’s Pardon Clause authority. For
example, United States v. Klein described the President’s
pardon power as being “without limit,” 56 but, as I have
explained, that description is incorrect. 57 The Court’s 1974
decision in Schick v. Reed stated that the President’s
clemency power “flows from the Constitution alone, not from
therefore archaic.
53. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927).
54. Perovich involved a commutation, not a pardon, but the Court’s rationale
applies to all forms of clemency.
55. See Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 8–9 (2011) (describing clemency (in a
state case) as “a prerogative granted to executive authorities to help ensure that
justice is tempered by mercy” and noting that “[i]t is not for the Judicial Branch
to determine the standards for this discretion.”).
56. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 148 (1872). The Court’s description in Ex parte
Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1867), of the pardon power as being
“unlimited,” suffers from the same flaws.
57. Supra text accompanying notes 29–39.
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any legislative enactments, and that it cannot be modified,
abridged, or diminished by the Congress.” 58 Descriptions like
those are useful if the issue is whether Congress or the courts
have trespassed on the President’s authority. They are not
helpful to a President trying to decide whether a particular
John or Jane Doe should receive relief.
Now we turn to history and tradition. Clemency is the
law’s version of mercy, and it has a history almost as old. 59
The English Crown has regularly exercised that power since
the days of the early kings, 60 and they handed the power off
to colonial governors in America. 61 The states have had a
clemency power since their origin (although they disagreed

58. 419 U.S. 256, 266 (1974).
59. See, e.g., Genesis 4:11–16 (describing the Mark of Cain); Matthew 27:15–
23 (describing Pontius Pilate’s decision to pardon Barabbas during Passover);
William W. Smithers, The Use of the Pardoning Power, 52 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& SOC. SCI. 61, 62 (1914) (The clemency power “has never been overlooked . . .
since the dawn of history.”). The Code of Hammurabi in Mesopotamia, one of the
earliest legal codes, has a provision for clemency. CROUCH, supra note 2, at 10–
11. Greek and Roman rulers, as well as the earliest English, Scottish, and Irish
kings, exercised that power. For discussions of clemency in the days of the Greek
and Roman Empires, see generally KONSTAN, supra note 2; DOWLING, supra note
2; GRISWOLD, supra note 2; Lanni, supra note 2. For a discussion of clemency in
the pre- and early common law days of England, see KELHAM, supra note 2, at
63–65, 86, 88. See generally HURNAND, supra note 2; ROBERTSON, supra note 2.
60. See, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *397; COKE, supra note 2, at 233;
J.M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND, 1660–1800, at 430–449 (1986);
J.H. Baker, Criminal Courts and Procedure at Common Law, in CRIME IN
ENGLAND, 1550–1800, at 44–45 (J.S. Cockburn ed., 1977); J.A. SHARPE, CRIME IN
EARLY MODERN ENGLAND, 1550–1750, at 68, 145 (1984). See generally HEWITT,
supra note 2; KESSELRING, supra note 2; LACEY, supra note 2; C.H. ROLPH, THE
QUEEN’S PARDON (1978); Grupp, supra note 2; McSweeney, supra note 2.
61. See generally Duker, supra note 2. For example, the Virginia Charter of
1609 granted the governor “full and absolute Power and Authority to correct,
punish, pardon, govern, and rule” all English subjects in the colony. 7 FRANCIS
NEWTON THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS,
AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATE, TERRITORIES, OR COLONIES NOW OR
HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3800–01 (2016) (1909).
The Crown delegated similar authority to the proprietor, the chief executive
official, or the royal governor in the other colonies. GREENBERG, supra note 2, at
127–32; RANKIN, supra note 2, at 109–13; Duker, supra note 2, at 498–500.
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over which branch of government should possess it). 62 As
noted above, the Framers vested that power in the
President, 63 and, beginning with George Washington,
62. See, e.g., In re Flournoy, 1 Ga. 606, 607 (1846); State v. Alexander, 76 N.C.
231, 231 (1877); Diehl v. Rodgers, 32 A. 424, 426 (Pa. 1895); JENSEN, supra note
3; STRANGE, supra note 31; SMITHERS, supra note 31. After the Revolution, state
legislatures often shared the clemency power with governors or controlled its
exercise. Today, governors generally have the same plenary clemency authority
as the President, but a few can grant relief only upon an affirmative
recommendation from a state board. Elizabeth Rapaport, Retribution and
Redemption in the Operation of Executive Clemency, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1501,
1505–06 (2000).
63. Clemency was the subject of little discussion at the Convention of 1787.
Duker, supra note 2, at 501–06; see also Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 112
(1925); Todd David Peterson, Congressional Power over Pardon and Amnesty:
Legislative Authority in the Shadow of Presidential Prerogative, 38 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 1225, 1229–30 (2003). The Framers agreed that the new nation required
a chief executive officer, and both basic models—the Virginia Plan and the New
Jersey Plan—created one. Neither plan, however, vested that executive with
clemency authority. Alexander Hamilton and John Rutledge proposed adding a
provision granting the chief executive pardon authority. The Hamilton-Rutledge
proposal resembled the English Act of Settlement of 1701: the chief executive
could excuse someone from a crime or its punishment, but he could not prevent
the Congress from removing a government official from office. The Convention
accepted their proposal. Once it had accepted the Hamilton-Rutledge proposal,
the Convention spent little time debating the pardon authority. Duker, supra
note 2, at 501–06. The Convention did reject proposals to limit its reach. Roger
Sherman moved to limit the power to grant a reprieve until the next session of
the Senate and to require the Senate to concur in the granting of a pardon. 2 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 419 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
[hereinafter FARRAND]. George Mason opposed Sherman’s proposal on the ground
that the Senate already would enjoy excessive authority. Id. Edmund Randolph
would have exempted treason from the category of pardonable offenses. Id. at
626. James Iredell opposed the exemption for two reasons: the exemption did not
exist under English law, and the likelihood of the President committing treason
was “very slight.” PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 351–
52 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 2012) (1968)); see Duker, supra note 2, at 502–04.
The Convention rejected each proposal. See 2 FARRAND, supra, at 419, 626. Luther
Martin sought to make the pardon power a purely post-conviction remedy. Martin
withdrew his proposal once James Wilson pointed out that a pre-trial pardon
might be necessary to secure the testimony of accomplices. Duker, supra note 2,
at 501–02.
The Pardon Clause also occasioned little discussion at the state ratifying
conventions. Id. at 505; see also, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 74, at 473 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“Humanity and good policy conspire to
dictate, that the benign prerogative of pardoning should be as little as possible
fettered or embarrassed.”); 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *401 (“[T]he king may
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Presidents until recently used it often. 64
Nonetheless, no sitting or former President has created
a useful set of principles, or even a “go-by,” for his own use or
for successors. 65 Our fifth President adopted the Monroe
Doctrine, Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation
Proclamation, and Woodrow Wilson had his Fourteen Points,
but no President has seen fit to offer a comprehensive and
objective approach to clemency. Presidents have granted
clemency for good reasons—such as distrust in the accuracy
of a conviction, belief that a sentence is too punitive, and the
need to reward exemplary conduct—as well as some bad
ones—such as payback to cronies. 66 Even William Howard
extend his mercy upon what terms he pleases, and may annex to his bounty a
condition, either precedent or subsequent, on the performance whereof the
validity of the pardon will depend; and this by the common law.”).
64. See, e.g., CROUCH, supra note 2, at 40–45, 55–56; Duker, supra note 2, at
511–16; Love, Pardon Twilight, supra note 5; Ruckman, 21st Century, supra note
5, at 470; Ruckman, Seasonal Clemency, supra note 5, at 27; see also Larkin,
Revitalizing Clemency, supra note 5, at 854–55.
65. One made, at best, a passing effort. See infra note 67.
66. Some Presidents have abused their authority. Bill Clinton was twice
guilty of that offense. He offered conditional commutations to members of a
Puerto Rican terrorist group very possibly to persuade the Puerto Rican
community to vote for his wife Hillary, who was campaigning for the US Senate,
and for Vice President Al Gore, who was running for President. See, e.g.,
Margaret Colgate Love, Of Pardons, Politics, and Collar Buttons: Reflections on
the President’s Duty to be Merciful, 27 FORDHAM URB. L. REV. 1483, 1484 (2000)
[hereinafter Love, Merciful]. Later, during his last 24 hours in office, Clinton
“grant[ed] pardons and commutations the same way that a drunken sailor on
shore leave spends money.” Larkin, Revitalizing Clemency, supra note 5, at 881.
Oftentimes, clemency recipients had White House connections or had contributed
to the President’s party or Presidential library. One recipient, Marc Rich, was a
fugitive from justice. See Alschuler, supra, note 15, at 1168 (“In 1215, the Magna
Carta declared, ‘To no one will we sell, to none will we deny or delay, right or
justice.’ In the administration of President Bill Clinton, the charter’s pledge was
broken.” (footnote omitted)); Love, Pardon Twilight, supra note 5. Other
Presidents have come under fire as well. See, e.g., STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE
MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 24 (2012) (“Presidential clemency is criticized
as a perk for the rich and powerful, ranging from vice-Presidential aide I. Lewis
Libby to fugitive commodities trader Marc Rich.”); Stephen L. Carter, The IranContra Pardon Mess, 29 HOUSTON L. REV. 883, 883–87 (1992) (criticizing George
H.W. Bush’s Iran-Contra pardons); Jeffrey Crouch, Presidential Misuse of the
Pardon Power, 38 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 722, 722, 731 (2008) (criticizing George
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Taft—who was the 27th President before he became the 10th
Chief Justice and therefore had a unique perspective on
clemency—never offered a useful approach. He just repeated
what Justice Holmes wrote in Perovich, which was not
helpful. 67
Moreover, although Presidents rely on the Justice
Department’s advice in individual cases, Presidents have not
directed the Justice Department to devise a recommended
decision-making process. The Office of the Pardon Attorney
(OPA) has drafted standards for its use in making pardon
and commutation decisions, and those standards identify a
variety of factors relevant to any clemency decision. 68
Nonetheless, the OPA standards do not focus the President’s
judgment in the same manner as a decision tree would. The
standards leave the President with the burden of making a
totality of the circumstance’s judgment. Some current or
former Justice Department officials involved in the clemency
process have offered their opinions on general principles that
Presidents should use. 69 General principles are a good
H.W. Bush’s Iran-Contra pardons, Clinton’s “midnight pardons,” and President
George W. Bush’s commutation of the sentence imposed on Scooter Libby); James
N. Jorgensen, Federal Executive Clemency Power: The President ‘s Prerogative to
Escape Accountability, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 345, 345–46 (1993) (criticizing George
H.W. Bush’s Iran-Contra pardons). Trump might have set a new, higher bar for
abuse. See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text.
67. See Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 121 (1925) (Taft, C.J.) (“Our
Constitution confers this discretion on the highest officer in the nation in
confidence that he will not abuse it.”); WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, OUR CHIEF
MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 121 (2011) (1925) (“The only rule that he [viz., the
President] can follow is that he shall not exercise it against the public interest.”).
68. See JUSTICE MANUAL tit. 9, § 9-140.112 (Apr. 2018).
69. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 3 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S SURVEY OF
RELEASE PROCEDURES: PARDONS (1939); Charles J. Bonaparte, The Pardoning
Power, 19 YALE L.J. 603 (1910) (former US Attorney General); Margaret Colgate
Love, Reinventing President’s Pardon Power, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 5, 5 (2007)
[hereinafter Love, Reinventing Pardons] (former Pardon Attorney); Samuel T.
Morison, The Politics of Grace: On the Moral Justification of Executive Clemency,
9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 1 (2005) (Attorney-Advisor within the Office of the
Pardon Attorney at time of publication); cf. Janice Rogers Brown, The Quality of
Mercy, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 327, 327 (1992) (former counsel to California Governor
Pete Wilson at publication, and now a former federal judge).
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starting point, but when it comes to considering specific
cases, they are not a helpful decision-making tool.
Does legal scholarship offer the President much
assistance? Again, the answer is, “No.” Most recent
scholarship has focused on the structure of the clemency
process or the hurdles that applicants must overcome to
obtain relief. 70 Some scholars have addressed the
substantive aspects of clemency and, for example, have
urged the President to be more merciful in his decisions than
the occupants of the White House have been over the last 40
years. 71 Even scholars, however, have not proposed an
70. See, e.g., GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW §§ 10.3.4–10.3.5,
at 810–17 (1978); Mark Strasser, The Limits of the Clemency Power on Pardons,
Retributivists, and the United States Constitution, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 85, 89 (2002).
See generally MARTHA MINOW, WHEN SHOULD LAW FORGIVE? (2019) [hereinafter
MINOW, LAW’S FORGIVENESS]; Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative
State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332 (2008); Stephanos Bibas,
Forgiveness in Criminal Procedure, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 329 (2007); David
Dolinko, Some Naive Thoughts About Justice and Mercy, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
349 (2009); Clifford Dorne & Kenneth Gewerth, Mercy in a Climate of Retributive
Justice: Interpretations from a National Survey of Executive Clemency
Procedures, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 413 (1999); Joshua
Dressler, Hating Criminals: How Can Something that Feels So Good Be Wrong?,
88 MICH. L. REV. 1448 (1990); Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen P. Garvey, The
Merciful Capital Juror, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 165 (2004); Heidi M. Hurd, The
Morality of Mercy, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 389 (2007); Daniel T. Kobil, Compelling
Mercy: Judicial Review and the Clemency Power, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 698 (2012);
Daniel T. Kobil, Should Mercy Have a Place in Clemency Decisions?, in
FORGIVENESS, MERCY, AND CLEMENCY 36 (Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain eds.,
2006); Stephen J. Morse, Justice, Mercy, and Craziness, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1485
(1984) (reviewing NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1982)); Mary
Sigler, Mercy, Clemency, and the Case of Karla Faye Tucker, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 455 (2007); Carol S. Steiker, Murphy on Mercy: A Prudential Reconsideration,
27 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, No. 2, Summer/Fall 2008, at 45; Carol Steiker, Tempering
or Tampering? Mercy and the Administration of Criminal Justice, in Sarat &
Hussain, supra, at 16, 23; see also supra note 14 (collecting authorities criticizing
the Justice Department’s role in the clemency process).
71. See generally Rachel E. Barkow, The Politics of Forgiveness:
Reconceptualizing Clemency, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 153 (2009); Chad Flanders,
Pardons and the Theory of the “Second-Best,” 65 FLA. L. REV. 1559 (2013); Dan
Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421 (2004); Robert L. Misner, A
Strategy for Mercy, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303 (2000). Kathleen Dean Moore’s
works are particularly thoughtful. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 44; Moore, Good
and Sufficient Reasons, supra note 40.
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objective decision-making approach, let alone anything
similar to what the US Sentencing Commission developed to
implement the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: 72 a grid
combining aggravating and mitigating factors of an offense
with the criminal history of the offender to generate a range
of months of imprisonment. 73
Another possibility is scholarship in the field of moral
philosophy. Western religion, ethics, literature, art, music,
and philosophy have celebrated and treasured the virtue of
mercy. 74 Scholars and artists have discussed the meaning of
72. Pub. L. No. 98-473, Ch. II, 98 Stat. 2031 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3551 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–98).
73. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, SENTENCING GUIDELINES 407 (2018) (Sentencing
Table). Initially mandatory, the Sentencing Guidelines are now merely advisory.
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005).
74. For religion and ethics, see, for example, Matthew 5:7 (the Beatitudes:
“Blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy.”); John 8:2–11 (“‘Neither
do I condemn thee: go, and sin no more.’”); ANTHONY BASH, FORGIVENESS AND
CHRISTIAN ETHICS (2010); MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND
FORGIVENESS (1998) [hereinafter MINOW, VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS]; GEIKO
MULLER-FAHRENHOLZ, THE ART OF FORGIVENESS: THEOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS ON
HEALING AND RECONCILIATION (1997); REINHOLD NIEBUHR, JUSTICE AND MERCY
(1974). For literature, see, for example, WILLIAM LANGLAND, PIERS PLOWMAN
(Oxford World’s Classics Reissue ed. 2009) (1367–70); John Milton, Paradise Lost,
Bk. X, in THE COMPLETE POEMS (Penguin Classics ed. 1999); WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE act 2, sc. 2; WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE
MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1. For art, see, for example, Rembrandt, The
Return of the Prodigal Son (c. 1661–1669); Peter Paul Rubens, Daniel in the
Lions’ Den (c. 1614–1616). For music, listen to Lin Manuel Miranda, It’s Quiet
Uptown, YOUTUBE (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v
=vjEoOeXId1k (from the musical Hamilton). For moral philosophy, see, for
example, CHARLES L. GRISWOLD, FORGIVENESS: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATION (2d
ed. 2007); CHRISTOPHER D. MARSHALL, BEYOND RETRIBUTION: A NEW TESTAMENT
VISION FOR JUSTICE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT (2001); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM,
ANGER AND FORGIVENESS: RESENTMENT, GENEROSITY, JUSTICE (2016); LINDA
RADZIK, MAKING AMENDS: ATONEMENT IN MORALITY, LAW, AND POLITICS (2011);
DOING JUSTICE TO MERCY: RELIGION, LAW, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Jonathan
Rothchild et al. eds., 2012); AUSTIN SARAT, MERCY ON TRIAL (2005); Lucy Allais,
Wiping the Slate Clean, 36 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 33 (2008); Joseph Beatty,
Forgiveness, 7 AM. PHIL. Q. 246 (1970); Christopher Bennett, The Limits of Mercy,
17 RATIO 1 (2004); David Cartwright, Revenge, Punishment, and Mercy: The SelfOvercoming of Justice, 17 INT’L STUD. PHIL. 17 (1985); Lawrence H. Davis, They
Deserve to Suffer, 32 ANALYSIS 136 (1972); R.S. Downie, Forgiveness, 15 PHIL. Q.
128 (1965); R.A. Duff, The Intrusion of Mercy, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 361 (2007);
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concepts such as “justice,” “mercy,” “forgiveness,” “leniency,”
“charity,” and “metanoia,” as well as the interrelationship
among them, such as the sometimes competing, sometimes
complementary relationships between “justice and mercy” or
“forgiveness and clemency.” 75 Unfortunately, most of the
discussion of those concepts takes place at the 30,000-foot
level and would not help a President make decisions in
individual cases.
C. The Need for an Objective Approach
Where does that leave us? The text of the Pardon Clause
gives little guidance on how the President should exercise
the authority it confers. The other traditional, potential
R.A. Duff, Justice, Mercy, and Forgiveness, 9 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 51 (1990)
(reviewing JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY (1988)
and MOORE, supra note 44); Jon Elster, Norms of Revenge, 100 ETHICS 862 (1990);
Alan P. Hamlin, Rational Revenge, 101 ETHICS 374 (1991); Donald Clark Hodges,
Punishment, 18 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RSCH. 209 (1957); H. Scott
Hestevold, Justice to Mercy, 46 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RSCH. 281 (1985);
H.J.N. Horsbrugh, Forgiveness, 4 CAN. J. PHIL. 269 (1974); Carla Ann Hage
Johnson, Entitled to Clemency: Mercy in the Criminal Law, 10 LAW & PHIL. 109
(1991); Stephen Kershnar, Mercy, Retributivism, and Harsh Punishment, 14
INT’L J. APPLIED PHIL. 209 (2000); John Kleinig, Mercy and Justice, 44
PHILOSOPHY 341 (1969); Ned Markosian, Two Puzzles About Mercy, 63 PHIL. Q.
269 (2013); William Neblett, The Ethics of Guilt, 71 J. PHIL. 652 (1974); Martha
C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 83 (1993); Lyla H.
O’Driscoll, The Quality of Mercy, 21 SO. J. PHIL. 229 (1983); George Rainbolt,
Mercy: In Defense of Caprice, 31 NOUS 226 (1997); John Rawls, Justice as
Fairness, 67 PHIL. REV. 164 (1958); H.R.T. Roberts, Mercy, 46 PHIL. 352 (1971);
Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain, On Lawful Lawlessness: George Ryan, Executive
Clemency, and the Rhetoric of Sparing Life, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1307 (2004); James
Sterba, Can a Person Deserve Mercy?, 10 J. SOC. PHIL. 11 (1979); Nigel Walker,
The Quiddity of Mercy, 70 PHILOSOPHY 27 (1995).
75. See, e.g., Claudia Card, On Mercy, 81 PHIL. REV. 182, 188 (1972); Alwynne
Smart, Mercy, 43 PHIL. 345, 348 (1968). See generally, e.g., JEFFRIE G. MURPHY &
JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY (1988) [hereinafter MURPHY &
HAMPTON]; FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS (Penguin
Classics 2014) (1887); Douglas N. Husak, “Already Punished Enough,” 18 PHIL.
TOPICS 79 (1990); Nicola Lacey & Hanna Pickard, To Blame or Forgive?
Reconciling Punishment and Forgiveness in Criminal Justice, 35 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 665 (2015); Paul Lauritzen, Forgiveness: Moral Prerogative or
Religious Duty?, 15 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 141 (1987); P. Twambley, Mercy and
Forgiveness, 36 ANALYSIS 84 (1976).
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sources of guidance also do not give a President the
specificity he needs. The question is what approach, if any,
should guide and focus a President’s decision-making.
Pardons and commutations differ greatly from each
other. Pardons raise definitional issues and epistemological
problems. What does it mean to be “innocent”? Is that merely
a factual matter (for example, the offender was in Miami
when the car was stolen in Pittsburgh)? Can it also be legal
(for example, he was convicted of a crime that is not a legally
chargeable offense because the underlying statute is
unconstitutional or his conduct is no longer a crime due to an
intervening, retroactive change in the law)? Can innocence
also be moral (for example, he was convicted of a crime
requiring only proof of negligence or of a strict liability
offense, one requiring no proof of any intent to break the law
or commit harm)? Commutations, by contrast, start from the
premise that the offender is guilty; the question is whether
his punishment is unduly severe. The result is that
commutation petitions raise line-drawing problems. When is
enough, enough? Where exactly to draw the line between a
reasonable and unreasonable punishment is a difficult
question to answer, and reasonable people can greatly
disagree over where that line should be.
I propose separate and different approaches for pardon
and commutation decisions. Neither approach relies on a
“totality of the circumstances” standard. In the case of
pardons, on a petitioner-by-petitioner basis, the President
should ask the following questions: First, is the petitioner
innocent? Second, if not, was the offense(s) of conviction an
isolated act or episode in an otherwise law-abiding life?
Third, if so, has the offender admitted his guilt, atoned for
his conduct and its harms, and reformed his errant ways?
Fourth, if so, would a pardon bring the criminal justice
system into disrepute? Fifth, regardless of the answer to the
first four questions, is there a statecraft justification for a
pardon, such as the need to end a rebellion, restore social
order, or heal a nation’s wounds? That proposed approach for
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the case of pardons differs materially from the one that
works best in the case of commutations, which I explain in
Part III. There, I recommend that the President use a
category-wide approach in connection with commutation
decisions, rather than make case-by-case judgments. He
should decide what maximum punishment is permissible for
particular categories of offenses and should not take up the
business of resentencing individual offenders. But first up is
the recommended approach for pardons.
II. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO PARDON DECISIONMAKING: A QUESTION-BASED APPROACH
A. Is the Applicant Innocent?
When a President or governor pardons someone on the
ground that he was wrongfully convicted, the traditional
explanation is that the clemency recipient was factually
innocent of the crime. That situation is often called the
classic “miscarriage of justice.” 76 Yet, the question whether
someone is “innocent” has more than one answer to it. 77
There are three aspects to that concept, and they raise
distinct issues.

76. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 415 (1993) (“Executive clemency
has provided the ‘fail safe’ in our criminal justice system. It is an unalterable fact
that our judicial system, like the human beings who administer it, is fallible. But
history is replete with examples of wrongfully convicted persons who have been
pardoned in the wake of after-discovered evidence establishing their innocence.”
(citation omitted) (quoting MOORE, supra note 44, at 131)).
77. In the ordinary case, someone seeking a pardon on innocence grounds has
already been convicted, so the presumption of innocence is long gone, and the
burden is on the applicant to establish that fact. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 399–400
(“Once a defendant has been afforded a fair trial and convicted of the offense for
which he was charged, the presumption of innocence disappears. . . . Thus, in the
eyes of the law, petitioner does not come before the Court as one who is ‘innocent,’
but, on the contrary, as one who has been convicted by due process of law of two
brutal murders.” (citation omitted)).
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1. Factual Innocence
The first question is an obvious one. The government
may not criminally punish someone unless and until it
proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 78 The criminal
justice system has adopted numerous procedural safeguards
against the prospect of convicting the innocent, 79 but no
system this side of the River Styx is perfect. For example, a
post-trial DNA test result might prove that the defendant
was not the offender. 80 A critical prosecution eyewitness may
recant his in-trial identification of the defendant. 81 The
government might not have disclosed exculpatory evidence
to the defendant before the trial finished. 82 Or evidence can
prove that a suspect falsely confessed. 83 A person who was in
Salt Lake City when a bank was robbed in New York City is
factually innocent of that crime. 84 Clemency has been “the
historic remedy”—the “fail safe”—to prevent “miscarriages of
justice,” and the conviction of an innocent person is the
78. See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465 (1991); In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970).
79. See, e.g., Larkin, Revitalizing Clemency, supra note 5, at 857–62.
80. The Innocence Project has used DNA evidence to prove that numerous
offenders were wrongly convicted. See, e.g., BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL
INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND HOW TO MAKE IT RIGHT 160–62
(2003).
81. Scholars have argued that eyewitness identifications are far less reliable
than the average person believes. See, e.g., Laura Engelhardt, The Problem with
Eyewitness Testimony, Commentary, 1 STAN. J. LEGAL STUD. 25, 29 (1999). See
generally ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1996).
82. See, e.g., Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 675, 694 (2004); Report to Hon.
Emmet G. Sullivan of Investigation Conducted Pursuant to the Court’s Order at
1, In Re Special Proc., 842 F. Supp. 2d 232 (2012) (No. 09-0198), 2012 WL 858523.
83. That counterintuitive result happens more often than the average person
knows. See, e.g., Adam Cohen, Why Innocent Men Make False Confessions, TIME
(Feb. 11, 2013), http://ideas.time.com/2013/02/11/why-innocent-men-make-falseconfessions [https://perma.cc/J3BP-WF3L]; Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People
Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com
/articles/archives/2014/nov/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty [https://perma
.cc/9F8B-K9R3].
84. Assuming that he had no involvement in the planning the crime or aiding
in its commission.
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archetypical example. 85 Presidents should readily pardon
anyone who can make that showing.
It is not always the case, however, that a clemency
applicant can prove his innocence. It could be that he can
only raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Maybe he can
show only that the process was corrupted by the
prosecution’s reliance on a jailhouse snitch whose veracity
and reliability are dubious at best. 86 Perhaps he can
demonstrate that the plea bargaining process effectively
coerced him to plead guilty to avoid continued pretrial
incarceration, to avoid the risk of an unduly punitive
mandatory minimum sentence after conviction, or to avoid
seeing a family member charged with a crime. 87 In other
words, a President will need to decide what degree of
confidence he will demand that only factually guilty
offenders will be convicted. That is a critical function of the
85. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 415 (1993); MOORE, supra note 44, at
131.
86. See, e.g., ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS
(2009).

THE EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 60

AND

87. See generally, e.g., ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND:
CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING
(2018); LYNCH, supra note 6; ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME:
HOW OUR MASSIVE MISDEMEANOR SYSTEM TRAPS THE INNOCENT AND MAKES
AMERICA MORE UNEQUAL (2018); John C. Coffee, Jr., “Twisting Slowly in the Wind”:
A Search for Constitutional Limits on Coercion of the Criminal Defendant, 1980
SUP. CT. REV. 211, 226 (“In some cases, ‘non-zero-sum’ bargaining . . . provides a
considerable risk of truth distortion. . . . Since this pretrial time must be credited
against the sentence imposed, an innocent defendant may find that he has
already served his sentence and can obtain virtual immediate release by pleading
guilty. In contrast, a protestation of innocence may result in continued pretrial
confinement. In this ‘Catch-22’ world in which confession leads to release more
quickly than does innocence, the prosecutor has the same leverage over the
innocent as he does over the guilty.” (citations omitted)); id. at 227–28 (noting
“the not infrequent case where the prosecutor threatens to prosecute relatives or
the spouse of a defendant if the defendant does not cooperate and/or plead guilty.
Here, because the injury to his relatives may be perceived by the defendant as a
more serious loss than his own conviction, the pressure can be sufficiently truth
distorting to result in a plea of guilty even when the probability of conviction is
relatively low. . . . When the prosecutor threatens either an enhanced penalty or
the indictment of others who are of concern to the defendant, he is raising the
cost of trial, and this can be truth distorting.” (citation omitted)).
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clemency process, because it allows the President to “set the
tone” for federal criminal prosecutions and, by example and
moral suasion, offer governors a standard that they also
should use. 88
2. Legal Innocence
The above hypothetical is an example of “factual”
innocence: the prisoner did not commit the physical acts
necessary to commit the crime of robbery. 89 That category,
however, is not exhaustive. There also are instances in which
a person can be “legally” innocent of a crime. He might have
committed all of the acts necessary to break the law, along
with the intent to do just that, but would be legally innocent
nonetheless.
How would that be possible? In at least two ways it could.
Perhaps the circuit courts of appeals have read a criminal
statute more broadly than its text permits, and the Supreme
Court does not correct their error before a defendant is
convicted under what turns out to be a mistaken
interpretation of the law. 90 Given the limited number of
federal cases that the Supreme Court reviews each year,
there is a risk that an erroneous interpretation could prevail
for years before the Court corrects it. In fact, given the
number of instances over the past few decades in which the
Court has rejected the Justice Department’s unduly
aggressive construction of various federal criminal laws,
there is far more than a mere “risk” that some people have

88. Obama, supra note 11, at 812 (“Presidencies can exert substantial
influence over the direction of the U.S. criminal justice system. Those privileged
to serve as President and in senior roles in the executive branch have an
obligation to use that influence to enhance the fairness and effectiveness of the
justice system at all phases.”).
89. For Latin fans, the term is “actus reus.” WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW
(5th ed. 2010).
90. See, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 143 (1995) (rejecting view
of every regional circuit as to the issue whether mere “possession” can ever
amount to the “use” of a firearm).
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been found guilty of conduct that was not a crime. 91
Or perhaps the statute creating the offense is
unconstitutional. 92 A classic example would be someone
convicted under an unconstitutionally vague statute—that
is, a law whose contours are so indecipherable that no
reasonable person would have known what precise conduct
is forbidden. 93 For example, people who speak loudly while
using cell phones in confined places (such as elevators, buses,
and subways) are, to use the vernacular, “annoying,” but the
legislature cannot make it a crime to “annoy” someone else
because that term is too nebulous to afford adequate notice

91. See, e.g., Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565, 1574 (2020); Rehaif v.
United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2200 (2019); McDonnell v. United States, 136 S.
Ct. 2355, 2375 (2016); Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 866 (2014); Skilling
v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 411 (2010); Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S.
12, 26–27 (2000); Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 857 (2000); United States
v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 411, 414 (1999); McNally v.
United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358 n.8, 360 (1987).
92. The concept of legal innocence follows logically from three settled
doctrines. One is the “Rule of Legality,” the principle that no one can be convicted
of committing a crime without a pre-existing law prohibiting that conduct. See
generally, e.g., Jerome Hall, Nulla Poena Sine Lege, 47 YALE L.J. 165 (1937). The
second principle is that an unconstitutional statute has no legal effect and
therefore cannot justify a criminal conviction or punishment. Norton v. Shelby
Cnty., 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886) (“An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers
no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is,
in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.”); see,
e.g., Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 603 (2015). The third principle is
that the Ex Post Facto Clauses prohibit new criminal laws from being applied
retroactively. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. § 10, cl. 1.
93. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2323 (2019) (“In our
constitutional order, a vague law is no law at all. Only the people’s elected
representatives in Congress have the power to write new federal criminal laws.
And when Congress exercises that power, it has to write statutes that give
ordinary people fair warning about what the law demands of them. Vague laws
transgress both of those constitutional requirements. They hand off the
legislature’s responsibility for defining criminal behavior to unelected
prosecutors and judges, and they leave people with no sure way to know what
consequences will attach to their conduct. When Congress passes a vague law,
the role of courts under our Constitution is not to fashion a new, clearer law to
take its place, but to treat the law as a nullity and invite Congress to try again.”).
See generally Anthony G. Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in
the Supreme Court, 109 U. PENN. L. REV. 67 (1960).
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of what is forbidden. 94 Those people have clearly done what
social mores deem irritating, but the law does not allow them
to be convicted of that crime, so they are legally innocent. A
President could pardon anyone convicted of such a crime
even if he had pleaded guilty to it or the courts had rejected
his vagueness claim. 95
3. Moral Innocence
The third category would be cases in which the petitioner
was “morally” innocent. That conclusion would be
appropriate in two situations. The first one is the scenario
described by the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., in his
1963 Letter from a Birmingham Jail: namely, conviction of
someone under a morally unjust law, “a code that is out of
harmony with the moral law.” 96 Fortunately, the racial
94. See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (holding that
the term “annoying” in a criminal law is unconstitutionally vague). Closely
related is the situation in which a court adopts an unforeseeably broad
interpretation of a criminal law. The text of a statute may be clear, but if the
courts interpret it in an unforeseeable manner, the result is not materially
different from a case where the statute is unduly vague. In each case, the law
winds up reaching conduct that no reasonable person would have thought was a
crime. See, e.g., Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 352 (1964) (“[A]
deprivation of the right of fair warning can result not only from vague statutory
language but also from an unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of
narrow and precise statutory language.”).
95. A person can be “legally” innocent even if he pleaded guilty. A guilty plea
ordinarily concedes the facts charged against a defendant, but not the
constitutionality of the government’s effort to bring a criminal prosecution. See
Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798, 805 (2018) (ruling that a guilty plea does
not bar a defendant from challenging the constitutionality of the underlying
statute creating the offense of conviction); Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62
n.2 (1975) (ruling that a guilty plea does not waive a Double Jeopardy Clause
claim raising the claim that “the charge is one which the State may not
constitutionally prosecute”); cf. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989)
(plurality opinion) (holding that the rule against retroactive application of new
constitutional decisions on federal habeas corpus would not apply if the new
decision “places certain types of primary, private individual conduct beyond the
power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe” (citation and internal
punctuation omitted)).
96. As King explained it in his letter:
One may well ask, “how can you advocate breaking some laws and obeying
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segregation against which he protested is no longer an
explicit part of the nation’s codes. Yet there is another
others?” The answer is found in the fact that there are two types of laws:
There are just and there are unjust laws. I would be the first to advocate
obeying just laws. I would agree with St. Augustine that “an unjust law is
no law at all.”
Now what is the difference between the two? How does one determine
whether a law is just or unjust? A just law is a man-made code that squares
with the moral law or the law of God. An unjust law is a code that is out of
harmony with the moral law. To put it in the terms of Saint Thomas
Aquinas, an unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal and
natural law. Any law that uplifts human personality is just. Any law that
degrades human personality is unjust. All segregation statutes are unjust
because segregation distorts the soul and damages the personality. It gives
the segregator a false sense of superiority, and the segregated a false sense
of inferiority. To use the words of Martin Buber, the great Jewish
philosopher, segregation substitutes an “I-it” relationship for the “I-thou”
relationship, and ends up relegating persons to the status of things. So
segregation is not only politically, economically and sociologically unsound,
but it is morally wrong and sinful. Paul Tillich has said that sin is
separation. Isn’t segregation an existential expression of man’s tragic
separation, an expression of his awful estrangement, his terrible
sinfulness? So I can urge men to disobey segregation ordinances because
they are morally wrong.
Let us turn to a more concrete example of just and unjust laws. An
unjust law is a code inflicted upon a minority which that minority had no
part in enacting or creating because they did not have the unhampered
right to vote. Who can say that the legislature of Alabama which set up the
segregation laws was democratically elected? Throughout the state of
Alabama all types of conniving methods are used to prevent Negroes from
becoming registered voters and there are some counties without a single
Negro registered to vote despite the fact that the Negro constitutes a
majority of the population. Can any law set up in such a state be considered
democratically structured?
....
We can never forget that everything Hitler did in Germany was “legal”
and everything the Hungarian freedom fighters did in Hungary was
“illegal.” It was “illegal” to aid and comfort a Jew in Hitler’s Germany. But
I am sure that if I had lived in Germany at the time I would have aided and
comforted my Jewish brothers even though it was illegal. If I lived in a
communist country today where certain principles dear to the Christian
faith are suppressed, I would openly advocate disobeying these antireligious laws.
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Letter from a Birmingham Jail, STANFORD UNIV. RSCH.
& EDUC. INST., http://okra.stanford.edu/transcription/document_images/undecid
ed/630416-019.pdf (last viewed Jan. 22, 2021).
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category of crimes that is out of step with the historic AngloAmerican division between moral and immoral conduct:
strict liability offenses.
Strict liability offenses outlaw an act without requiring
proof of any accompanying mental state, let alone the type of
mental state that the law has historically used to identify
parties who are morally blameworthy or “evil.” Historically,
the criminal law required the government to prove that
someone acted with a “guilty mind” or “evil intent” to prevent
someone morally blameless from being convicted. 97 “Actus
non facit reum nisi mens sit rea” means that a crime consists
of “a vicious will” and “an unlawful act consequent upon such
vicious will.” 98 For example, mistakenly taking someone
else’s umbrella rather than your own does not make you a
thief. For theft, the government must prove that you
intended to permanently deprive someone else of his
property. 99 A mistake of fact as to your ownership of the
umbrella is a complete defense.
Beginning in the nineteenth century, legislatures
decided to use the criminal law to police potentially harmful
business activities. 100 At first, strict liability offenses were
97. See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250–52 (1952) (“The
contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention
is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature
systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability
and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil. . . . Crime, as
a compound concept, generally constituted only from concurrence of an evilmeaning mind with an evil-doing hand, was congenial to an intense
individualism and took deep and early root in American soil.” (footnotes
omitted)).
98. See Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV L. REV. 974, 974 (1932). In
most cases moral, legal, and factual guilt entirely overlap. Someone who commits
a crime that has existed since the common law—murder, rape, robbery, and a few
others—committed the prohibited acts with an “evil intent.” LAFAVE, supra note
89.
99. See, e.g., Morissette, 342 U.S. at 260–61 (“State courts of last resort, on
whom fall the heaviest burden of interpreting criminal law in this country, have
consistently retained the requirement of intent in larceny-type offenses.”
(footnote omitted)).
100. See, e.g., Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Strict Liability Offenses, Incarceration, and
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few in number, minor in nature, and punishable by no more
than a fine. Today, however, there are numerous strict
liability statutes, to say nothing of implementing agency
regulations, many of them which expose an unwitting
offender to imprisonment. Known as “public welfare
offenses” or “strict liability crimes,” those statutes use the
criminal law to regulate conduct that has become of concern
since the advent of the Industrial Revolution, the growth of
urbanization, and the interdependence characteristic of
modern-day life. 101 Criminal justice scholars have long
criticized reliance on the criminal law to police conduct that
is not morally blameworthy. 102 Nonetheless, some politicians
have continued to defend such laws on the putative ground
that sacrificing morally blameless individuals is necessary to
avoid “undermin[ing] public safety” and “harm[ing]
progressive goals.” 103 At the same time, Congress likes
having strict liability offenses available. Because they are
crimes rather than mere civil infractions, federal agents can
enforce them, obviating the need to create a new cadre of civil
inspectors that lack the nimbus possessed by officers with

the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1065,
1079–1101 (2014) [hereinafter Larkin, Strict Liability].
101. See id. at 1074–79.
102. See id. at 1079–81, 1081 n.46.
103. Obama, supra note 11, at 829 n.89. In addition, the Supreme Court (albeit,
often in dicta) routinely voices, without any discussion or analysis, the old saw
that “[i]gnorance of the law is no defense.” See, e.g., Shaw v. United States, 137
S. Ct. 462, 468 (2016); McFadden v. United States, 576 U.S. 186, 192 (2015);
Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723, 734–35 (2015); Bryan v. United States, 524
U.S. 184, 195 (1998); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 149 (1994); Cheek v.
United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991); United States v. Int’l Mins. & Chem.
Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957);
Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 68 (1910); Armour Packing Co.
v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 85 (1907); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
167 (1878) (“Ignorance of a fact may sometimes be taken as evidence of a want of
criminal intent, but not ignorance of the law.”); Barlow v. United States, 32 U.S.
(7 Pet.) 404, 411 (1833) (“It is a common maxim, familiar to all minds, that
ignorance of the law will not excuse any person, either civilly or criminally. . . .”);
The Joseph, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 451, 454 (1814). For addicted Latin fans, the
phrase is “Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.”
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badges and guns. 104 As the result, strict liability offenses
often misuse the criminal law for what should be an ordinary
civil violation.
That’s not just my opinion. The Supreme Court criticized
criminal liability without fault long ago, 105 and more recently
has gone out of its way to avoid construing federal criminal
laws as creating strict liability offenses. 106 Numerous
criminal law scholars, such as William Blackstone, Lon
Fuller, H.L.A. Hart, Herbert Packer, Herbert Wechsler, and
numerous others, condemn strict liability offenses. 107
104. See Larkin, Strict Liability, supra note 100, at 1112–16.
105. See Felton v. United States, 96 U.S. 699, 703 (1877) (“But the law at the
same time is not so unreasonable as to attach culpability, and consequently to
impose punishment, where there is no intention to evade its provisions, and the
usual means to comply with them are adopted. All punitive legislation
contemplates some relation between guilt and punishment. To inflict the latter
where the former does not exist would shock the sense of justice of every one.”).
Then-contemporaneous state cases reflect the same judgment. See, e.g., People v.
Harris, 29 Cal. 678, 681 (1866) (“It is laid down in the books on the subject that
it is a universal doctrine that to constitute what the law deems a crime there
must concur both an evil act and an evil intent. Actus non facit reum nisi mens
sit rea.” (citation omitted)); State v. King, 86 N.C. 603, 606–07 (1882); State v.
Carson, 2 Ohio Dec. Reprint 81, 82–83 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas 1859): Miller v.
People, 5 Barb. 203, 203–04 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849).
106. See Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2195 (2019) (“Whether a
criminal statute requires the Government to prove that the defendant acted
knowingly is a question of congressional intent. In determining Congress’ intent,
we start from a longstanding presumption, traceable to the common law, that
Congress intends to require a defendant to possess a culpable mental state
regarding each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent
conduct. We normally characterize this interpretive maxim as a presumption in
favor of scienter, by which we mean a presumption that criminal statutes require
the degree of knowledge sufficient to make a person legally responsible for the
consequences of his or her act or omission.” (internal quotations and citations
omitted)); see also, e.g., Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723, 740 (2015);
McFadden v. United States, 576 U.S. 186, 195 (2015); Carter v. United States,
530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605–07 (1994);
Posters ‘N’ Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 524 (1994); Liparota v.
United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425–27 (1985); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.,
438 U.S. 422, 436–37 (1978); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250–51
(1952). That presumption is why the Supreme Court has read criminal statutes
to contain a mens rea element.
107. See, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *21; LON L. FULLER, THE
MORALITY OF LAW 77 (1964) (“Strict criminal liability has never achieved

2022]

FOCUSING PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY

41

Accordingly, a President could reasonably decide that strict
liability offenses are so out of line with historic AngloAmerican criminal law doctrines that he should use his
clemency power to pardon every offender who was convicted
of such a crime or who can establish that no one would have
known that the conduct charged against him was a crime. 108
respectability in our law.”); H.L.A. HART, Negligence, Mens Rea, and Criminal
Responsibility, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 136, 152 (H.L.A. Hart ed., 2d
ed. 2008) (“strict liability is odious”); HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL SANCTION 130–31 (1968); Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model
Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1109 (1952). See generally Larkin, Strict
Liability, supra note 100, at 1079 n.46 (collecting authorities). As Oxford
University Professor Jeremy Horder put it, the law “has failed to adapt its moral
thinking to modern circumstances.” JEREMY HORDER, EXCUSING CRIME 276
(2004).
108. Issuance of a pardon for every person convicted of a strict liability offense
would raise the question whether the President has effectively “suspended” the
effect of such laws, in violation of his duty under the Take Care Clause to enforce
the law. See, e.g., Howell v. McAuliffe, 788 S.E. 2d 706, 720–24 (Va. 2016) (ruling
that governor’s executive order granting voting rights to all formerly imprisoned
felons violated the state constitutional provision against “suspension” of the law);
Carolyn A. Edie, Revolution and the Rule of Law: The End of the Dispensing
Power, 1689, 10 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 434, 440 (1977); Larkin, Guiding
Clemency, supra note 41, at 467 n.88; cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The
Privilege of the Writ of habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”). The Stuart
Kings in England (particularly James II) claimed that the Crown had the
inherent right to suspend the operation of any law that Parliament enacted.
Parliament ultimately won that battle, enacting the Bill of Rights of 1688, which
prohibited the Crown from suspending the law without Parliament’s
authorization. See Bill of Rights 1688, 1 W. & M. sess. 2 c. 2 (original text
modernized) (“That the pretended Power of Suspending of Laws or the Execution
of Laws by Regal Authority without Consent of Parliament is illegal. That the
pretended Power of Dispensing with Laws or the Execution of Laws by Regal
Authority as it has been assumed and exercised of late is illegal.”). The Article II
Take Care Clause incorporates that limitation on presidential power. See, e.g.,
PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 65–73 (2014) (discussing
the background to the Take Care Clause). This is not the place to offer a complete
answer to that question, but I will make two points.
First, to some extent, every exercise of the President’s clemency power
effectively defeats the implementation of an act of Congress. As Judge Frank
Easterbrook put it, “Pardons do frustrate the implementation of laws, but as all
pardons do so to some degree, the existence of the pardon clause must authorize
nonenforcement, at least at retail rather than wholesale.” Frank H. Easterbrook,
Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 905, 909 (1999); see also Austin
Sarat, Mercy, Clemency, and Capital Punishment: Two Accounts, 3 OHIO ST. J.
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CRIM. L. 273, 275 (2005) [hereinafter Sarat, Mercy] (“The idea that clemency and
mercy can be given (or withheld) ‘freely’ as well as Blackstone’s description of it
as a ‘court of equity,’ highlights their complex and unstable relationship to law.
Like all sovereign prerogative, clemency’s efficacy is bound up in its very
disregard of declared law. Thus, more than half a century before Blackstone, John
Locke famously defined prerogative as the ‘power to act according to discretion
for the public good, without the prescription of the law and sometimes even
against it, is that which is called prerogative. . . . [T]here is a latitude left to the
Executive power to do many things of choice which the laws do not prescribe.’”).
While Judge Easterbrook seems to have distinguished between the validity of
individual and category-wide pardons, the President can grant pardons on either
basis. Numerous Presidents have done so, Larkin, Guiding Clemency, supra note
41 (collecting cases), and the Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed that
practice, see United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1872) (“Pardon
includes amnesty.”). See also, e.g., Jenkins v. Collard, 145 U.S. 546, 560 (1892);
Armstrong v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154, 155 (1871); United States v.
Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531, 542–43 (1869). The number of people excused
therefore cannot matter.
Second, Presidents and senior law enforcement officers can empower
federal agents to commit crimes (such as possessing contraband) when engaged
in a legitimate law enforcement operation (such acting in an undercover capacity
to infiltrate a drug trafficking organization). See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
UNDERCOVER AND SENSITIVE OPERATIONS UNIT, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES
ON FBI UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS § IV.H. (2017); Elizabeth E. Joh, Breaking the
Law to Enforce It: Undercover Police Participation in Crime, 62 STAN L. REV. 155,
156 (2009) (“Covert policing necessarily involves deception, which in turn often
leads to participation in activity that appears to be criminal. In undercover
operations, the police have introduced drugs into prison, undertaken
assignments from Latin American drug cartels to launder money, established
fencing businesses that paid cash for stolen goods and for ‘referrals,’ printed
counterfeit bills, and committed perjury, to cite a few examples.” (footnotes
omitted)). That practice, which is widely used today by law enforcement agencies
of all shapes and sizes, see id. at 163, was unknown to the English criminal law
in the seventeenth century, when the English Crown’s suspension of the law
prompted Parliament to forbid the king from suspending the law without
Parliament’s authorization. To be sure, the Supreme Court has not specifically
addressed the relationship between the Pardon and Suspension Clauses. But it
has considered numerous cases involving the use of undercover officers, and it
has never suggested that this practice “suspends” the operation of the federal
criminal code. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Hoffa v.
United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966);
Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963). On the contrary, the Court has held
that, when the government authorizes a law enforcement officer (or anyone else
for that matter, such as an informant) to engage in such conduct, the government
cannot later prosecute that officer for committing that crime. See, e.g., United
States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 673–74 (1973); Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 559, 569–73 (1965). The difference between an ex ante authorization to
commit a crime for which the defendant is immune from prosecution and an ex
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Doing so would avoid the risk that a morally blameless party
could violate a law that neither he nor any reasonable person
would have known existed. 109 In my opinion, the President
should use his clemency power to pardon every such
offender. 110 Regardless, there will be occasions where a
person is found or pleads guilty to conduct that is not morally
objectionable. Those cases would be instances of moral
innocence.
B. Was the Offense of Conviction an Isolated Act or Episode
in an Otherwise Law-Abiding Life?
The law and philosophy of clemency have always placed
limits on the chief executive’s forgiveness. It is not a defense
to a crime that John or Jane had a disadvantaged upbringing
(e.g., he had only one parent (or none), he grew up in a poor
or crime-ridden neighborhood, he went to low-quality
schools, and so forth). Society can place crimes like murder,
ante pardon for the future commission of that crime is like the difference between
dusk and twilight.
109. Precedent exists for that practice. English kings used their clemency
powers to spare morally blameless parties from the gallows or prison because
reasonable criminal law defenses were unavailable. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr. &
GianCarlo Canaparo, Are Criminals Bad or Mad? Premeditated Murder, Mental
Illness, and Kahler v. Kansas, 43 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 85, 116–17 (2020).
Presidents and governors have done the same. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Mistakes and
Justice—Using the Pardon Power to Remedy a Mistake of Law, 15 GEO. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 651, 664 (2017) [hereinafter Larkin, Pardoning Mistakes]. Clemency
would also serve the purposes of the criminal law. Because “compliance
presupposes knowledge,” Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law
Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 400, a pardon would remedy the grossly unfair
result that the modern-day federal criminal code requires more knowledge of the
law than can be demanded of the average person. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The
Folly of Requiring Complete Knowledge of the Criminal Law, 12 LIBERTY U. L.
REV. 335, 345–69 (2018). A pardon would also return to prominence the
foundational proposition, ignored (but implicitly rejected) by strict liability’s
advocates, that the criminal law should prefer the release of ten guilty parties to
the wrongful conviction of one. See, e.g., Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432,
456 (1895); 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, *358. Accordingly, the President should
forgive morally innocent parties no less than the factually or legally innocent
ones.
110. Larkin, Pardoning Mistakes, supra note 109, at 663–68.
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rape, robbery, burglary, and heroin trafficking out of bounds
for everyone, even for people who did not grow up in Sutton
Place or Beacon Hill. 111 In fact, it is especially important to
enforce the law in neighborhoods where large numbers of
people are tempted to break it, because the law-abiding
residents in those neighborhoods suffer the most when crime
is rampant. 112
Nonetheless, in some cases a person who committed but
one crime, or had but one criminal episode, in an otherwise
law-abiding life is the type of person society should be willing
to consider forgiving. Otherwise, as Hannah Arendt once
noted, we would be forever frozen in time by one moment in
111. American criminal law has never recognized a “severe environmental
depredation” defense, a defense that is also (and more colorfully) known as the
“rotten social background” defense. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 70, at 801;
Peter Arenella, Demystifying the Abuse Excuse: Is There One?, 19 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 703, 704 (1996) (stating that the only abuse excuse for which a
defendant may use evidence of past victimization to negate legal responsibility is
the insanity defense); Morse, supra note 70, at 1489 (“The reason we do not
excuse most disadvantaged criminals (or other persons whose criminality can be
causally explained) is not our lack of sympathy for their unfortunate
backgrounds, or our failure to recognize that social disadvantage is a powerful
cause of crime, as it surely is. Rather, we hold most disadvantaged defendants
responsible because they possess minimal rationality and self-control. A
disadvantaged defendant ‘driven crazy’ by his life circumstances will be excused
because he is crazy, not because he is disadvantaged or because his behavior was
caused.” (footnote omitted)); Paul H. Robinson, Are We Responsible for Who We
Are? The Challenge for Criminal Law Theory in Defenses of Coercive
Indoctrination and “Rotten Social Background,” 2 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 53, 54
(2011); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Rule of Criminal Law: Why Courts and
Legislatures Ignore Richard Delgado’s Rotten Social Background, 2 ALA. C.R. &
C.L. L. REV. 79, 82 (2011); cf. United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 959 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) (coining the term “rotten social
background”).
112. See, e.g., FRANKLIN ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE: NEW YORK’S
LESSONS FOR URBAN CRIME AND ITS CONTROL 170 (2013) (“Violent crime is one of
the most regressive taxes operating in the United States, with almost all of its
negative effects concentrated among low-income minority groups and residential
areas. The dark-skinned poor pay twice for high rates of violent crime—with rates
of victimization many times higher than middle-income white and Asian groups
and with rates of imprisonment vastly higher than non-minority populations. So
large declines in serious crimes should generate double benefits.”); Paul J.
Larkin, Jr. & David Rosenthal, Flight, Race, and Terry Stops: Commonwealth v.
Warren, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 163, 206–16 (2018).
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our past. 113 Of course, that decision is a complicated one.
Numerous factors are relevant, such as what that crime
was—viz., the type of crime and its surrounding context
(Usama bin Laden’s mass murder versus Dr. Samuel Mudd’s
treatment of the fractured leg of John Wilkes Booth); the
reason why the offender committed the crime (Bernie
Madoff’s greed versus Jean Valjean’s need to feed his family);
the number and nature of the person(s) injured by the crime
(theft from the “widows and orphans” fund versus theft from
Bill Gates); the presence or absence of violence (engaging in
torture and murder versus fibbing about your income); the
age and status of the person who committed the crime (a capo
in the Gambino Family who masterminds a continuing
criminal drug enterprise versus a teenager who takes a car
for a “joy ride”); and the host of other aggravating and
mitigating factors that society considers relevant at
sentencing. 114 A mass murderer should not qualify for a
pardon regardless of how repentant he is about his 100th
homicide. Someone arrested before releasing ricin on a
crowded New York City subway car is in the same moral
category as someone who completed that crime even though
the police foiled his plot before he killed or injured any
straphangers. Someone who spent decades laundering
money for the Sinaloa Cartel also does not count. Not only
were his offenses numerous over a lengthy period, but his
crimes fueled the violence that the cartels wreak on society.
113. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 237 (1958) (“Without being
forgiven, released from the consequences of what we have done, our capacity to
act would, as it were, be confined to one single deed from which we could never
recover; we would remain the victims of its consequences forever, not unlike the
sorcerer’s apprentice who lacked the magic formula to break the spell.”).
114. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (“No limitation shall be placed on the
information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person
convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and
consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”); Pepper v. United
States, 562 U.S. 476, 487–90 (2011); ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND PENAL
POLICY 168–69 (1983); C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT: A
PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION 146–50 (1987); NIGEL WALKER, AGGRAVATION,
MITIGATION AND MERCY IN ENGLISH CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1999).
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What I have in mind as the classic case is someone who
got into a fistfight in a bar while drunk or at high school after
receiving an insult; who was convicted of, or pleaded guilty
to, assault years ago; and who has kept his nose clean ever
since. 115 I would also consider eligible someone who
committed a very small number of crimes over a limited
period long ago, but who since then has straightened up and
now flies right. Indeed, the case of St. Paul of Tarsus shows
us that there might even be room for someone who
participated in a seriously violent act but since then has
undergone a true personal moral reformation. 116
By contrast, an offender with multiple convictions,
particularly for well-planned crimes of violence or fraud, or
who, to use the vernacular, has a “rap sheet as long as my
arm,” is far more physically or financially dangerous and
morally reprehensible than someone who committed an
offense only once, long ago, and never broke bad again. For
more than a century, American law has imposed enhanced
punishment on recidivists and has permitted sentencing
courts to consider other crimes an offender committed even
if he was not convicted of them. 117 At the same time,
115. See Ehrlich, supra note 31, at 675 (“Some of these cases are very easy,
particularly in Maryland. We have a lot of people who need pardons because they
want to qualify for federal employment. So you get in a fistfight in Ocean City,
Maryland, when you’re seventeen, and you’re forty-eight years old and you need
national security clearance for [the National Security Agency], and you can’t get
it. They’re easy.”).
116. Compare, e.g., Acts 7:58–9:2, with, e.g., id. 9:3–31; Romans 1:1–16:27;
1 Corinthians 1:1–16:24. My Exhibit A would be Georgetown Law Center
Professor Shon Hopwood, as good an example of metanoia as there could be. See,
e.g., SHON HOPWOOD, LAW MAN: MEMOIRS OF A JAILHOUSE LAWYER (2d ed. 2017);
Shon Hopwood, Geo. L. Ctr., https://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/shonhopwood/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
117. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 24 (2003) (upholding a state
“three strikes” law and noting that, historically, numerous states had adopted
such laws in response “to widespread public concerns about crime by targeting
the class of offenders who pose the greatest threat to public safety: career
criminals”); id. at 24–26 (collecting cases upholding recidivist statutes); United
States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997) (ruling that a sentencing judge may
consider conduct underlying a charge for which the defendant was acquitted as
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American society is willing to forgive someone who slipped
up once or twice and who is truly repentant. 118 Those
judgments are sensible ones, and they complement each
other. A President should be free to make them.
C. Has the Offender Admitted His Guilt, Atoned for His
Conduct and its Harms, and Reformed His Errant Ways?
The criminal law began to consider the rehabilitation of
offenders an important goal in the nineteenth century.
Indeed, the earliest juvenile detention facilities were called
“reformatories,” because their goal was the transformation of
the offender’s character through repentance. 119 The criminal
justice system became more punitive during the last three
decades of the twentieth century than it had been for the first
seven. 120 Nonetheless, the system did not completely
forswear any consideration of rehabilitation. Rehabilitation
of offenders was the rationale for the creation of
“penitentiaries” in the nineteenth century, 121 and it served
as the primary, if not exclusive, goal of punishment from late
long as the government can prove that conduct by a preponderance of the
evidence); United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 55 (1978) (ruling that a trial
judge may consider at sentencing his conclusion that the defendant committed
perjury when testifying at trial even though he was not convicted of or charged
with that offense).
118. See Sigler, supra note 70, at 466 (noting “our general intuition that an
offender who has lived am exemplary life both before and after a (possibly
anomalous) transgression generally deserves a less severe punishment than an
unrepentant offender whose life has been dominated by corruption and vice”).
119. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Parole: Corpse or Phoenix?, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
303, 307–10 (2015) [hereinafter, Larkin, Parole].
120. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Clemency, Parole, Good-Time Credits, and
Crowded Prisons: Reconsidering Early Release, 11 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 31–
32 (2013) [hereinafter Larkin, Early Release].
121. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 219–30
(3d ed. 2005); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER
AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC ch. 4 (rev. ed. 1990); Larkin, Parole, supra
note 119, at 309 (“The theory was that new medical, sociological, and
psychological theories and techniques could transform a prison from ‘the black
flower of civilized society’ into the equivalent of a hospital where prisoners would
be treated and reformed, rather than punished.” (footnotes omitted)).
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in that century to the last few decades of the twentieth. 122
The American public still believes in the possibility of
redemption and is willing to give reformed offenders a second
chance. As Professors Francis Cullen and Cheryl Lero
Jonson have written, “the belief that a core function of
prisons should be rehabilitation is woven deeply into the
nation’s cultural fabric. This belief in reforming offenders
may become frayed at times, but it is durable enough to avoid
becoming fully unraveled.” 123 Reflecting that belief, the
Second Chance Act of 2007 authorizes grant programs to
help offenders start a new life after release. 124
As relevant here, two questions arise. Can the law
demand that an offender prove his rehabilitation as a
condition of eligibility for clemency? And as partial proof of
rehabilitation, can the law require that an offender
demonstrate repentance by honestly admitting his crimes,
atoning for his wrongdoing, and turning his life around? 125
The answer to each question is, “Yes.” The institution of pleabargaining rests on the proposition that a defendant can be
122. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) (“Retribution is
no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and
rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal
jurisprudence.”). The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA) bars a district court
from considering at sentencing the defendant’s prospects for rehabilitation.
18 U.S.C. §§ 3562(a), 3563(a)(4), 3563(b)(9), 3563(b)(11), 3583(c)–(d); 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(k); Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 332 (2011). The Federal Bureau
of Prisons may consider that factor when deciding where a prisoner should be
housed and what potentially rehabilitative programs he should enter. 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3621(b), 3621(e)–(f), 3624(f); Tapia, 564 U.S. at 330–31.
123. FRANCIS T. CULLEN & CHERYL LERO JONSON, CORRECTIONAL THEORY:
CONTEXT AND CONSEQUENCES 29 (2012).
124. Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 17501–
55); see Larkin, Early Release, supra note 120, at 33 & n.191.
125. For an excellent definition of “repentance,” see Jeffrie G. Murphy,
Repentance, Punishment, and Mercy, in REPENTANCE: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 143, 147 (Amitai Etzioni & David E. Carney eds. 1997): “Repentance
is the remorseful acceptance of responsibility for one’s wrongful and harmful
actions, the repudiation of the aspects of one’s character that generated the
actions, the resolve to do one’s best to extirpate those aspects of one’s character,
and the resolve to atone or make amends for the harm that one has done.”
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denied leniency at sentencing if he refuses the government’s
offer of a reduced sentence in exchange for pleading guilty
and demands a trial. In 1978, the Supreme Court expressly
upheld that practice in Bordenkircher v. Hayes. 126 The
Supreme Court has ruled that a defendant can be required
to accept responsibility for his crimes, even to assist the
government to prosecute other offenders, as a condition for
the receipt of a benefit at sentencing. 127 Moreover, the
government can place on a convicted offender the burden of
showing that he has been rehabilitated and no longer is the
same person who broke the law. 128 Indeed, the United States
Sentencing Commission has promulgated Sentencing
Guidelines that allow for a reduction in a sentence only “[i]f
the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of
responsibility for his offense.” 129 If a sentencing judge can
make that demand at the front end of the punishment
process, it follows then that the President can demand that
an offender demonstrate repentance as a condition of
eligibility for clemency. 130
126. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (“Plea bargaining
flows from the mutuality of advantage to defendants and prosecutors, each with
his own reasons for wanting to avoid trial. . . . By hypothesis, the plea may have
been induced by promises of a recommendation of a lenient sentence or a
reduction of charges, and thus by fear of the possibility of a greater penalty upon
conviction after a trial.” (citations and internal quotations omitted)).
127. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 558 (1980) (ruling that a
defendant can be required to assist the prosecution by testifying against
confederates to receive a reduced sentence); Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181,
185–86 (1992) (ruling that a defendant can be required to prove that a
prosecutor’s unwillingness to recommend leniency is the product of a
discriminatory intent); see also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal
Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 437 (1958).
128. That conclusion follows logically from the principle that a properly
convicted defendant “is eligible for, and the [sentencing] court may impose,
whatever punishment is authorized by statute for his offense” as long as that
penalty is neither cruel and unusual nor based on an arbitrary ground, such as
race. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465 (1991).
129. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (Nov. 1, 2018).
130. There is also philosophical and religious support for that conclusion. See
Jacob Neusner, Repentance in Judaism, in REPENTANCE: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 125, at 60, 61 (“God forgives sinners who atone and
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That conclusion aligns with the expectations of the
public. The average person likely would find it reasonable for
victims to demand confession and repentance as a
prerequisite to their private forgiveness of someone else, as
well as to the President’s official forgiveness of someone on
behalf of the nation. 131 Public confessions of wrongdoing
display respect for the dignity of victims and, if sincere, can
be a first step toward an offender’s rehabilitation. 132 As
repent, and asks of humanity that same act of grace—but no greater. For
forgiveness without a prior act of repentance not only violates the rule of justice
but also humiliates the law of mercy, cheapening and trivializing the
superhuman act[.] The role of the sinner is to repent.”); see id. (describing
repentance as “the critical center of the moral transaction” involving forgiveness).
To be sure, philosophers have debated whether forgiveness is possible in the
absence of confession and repentance, and they have come down on both sides of
that issue. A majority (or a considerable minority), however, sees confession and
repentance as necessary conditions for forgiveness. See, e.g., Luke 23:34; Matthew
6:15; GRISWOLD, supra note 74, at 49–51; KONSTAN, supra note 2, at x, xi, 6–7, 10,
59 (defining the modern understanding of forgiveness as “a response to an offense
that involves a moral transformation on the part of the forgiver and forgiven and
a complex of sentiments that include sincere confession, remorse, and
repentance”); Cheshire Calhoun, Changing One’s Heart, 103 ETHICS 76, 76
(1992); Aurel Kolnai, Forgiveness, 74 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 91, 97 (1974);
Lauritzen, supra note 75, at 144–49; Norvin Richards, Forgiveness, 99 ETHICS 77,
87 (1988). See generally MINOW, VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS, supra note 74, at
4 (“While some traditions treat forgiveness as a response to apology, repentance,
acts of reparation, or acceptance of sanctions, others support forgiveness without
any preconditions.” (footnote omitted)).
131. See KONSTAN, supra note 2, at 99 (to obtain forgiveness, one must
“repudiate the act of wrongdoing together with the values that permitted it; such
a repudiation ‘is a step toward showing that one is not simply the “same person”
who did the wrong’” (quoting GRISWOLD, supra note 74, at 50)); MINOW,
VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS, supra note 74, at 17 (While discussing atrocities,
she stated: “Forgiveness is a power held by the victimized, not a right to be
claimed. The ability to dispense, but also to withhold, forgiveness is an ennobling
capacity and part of the dignity to be reclaimed by those who survive the
wrongdoing. Even an individual survivor who chooses to forgive cannot, properly,
forgive in the name of other victims. To expect survivors to forgive is to heap yet
another burden on them.” (footnote omitted)).
132. See Anastasia Moloney, Ex-Child Soldiers in Colombia Face Their
Tormentors, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 23, 2015), https://www.csmonitor.com/
World/Making-a-difference/Change-Agent/2015/0223/Ex-child-soldiers-in-Colom
bia-face-their-tormentors (remarks of Maria Eugenia Morales, a senior
Colombian official, in the context of the public confession of guilt for recruiting
child soldiers by a former member of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia:
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Jeffrie Murphy put it, “In having a sincere change of heart,”
the offender “is withdrawing his endorsement from his own
immoral past behavior; he is saying, ‘I no longer stand
behind the wrongdoing and want to be separated from it; I
stand with you in condemning it.’” 133
A public admission of responsibility also enables a
President to decide whether a clemency applicant is truly
sorry for his conduct and has genuinely turned his life
around or just regrets being caught. A public confession of
guilt offers a trial judge the opportunity to decide at
sentencing whether an offender’s statement is an honest
expression of guilt and remorse or merely a sham uttered in
the hope of receiving a lighter punishment. So, too, a later
public confession gives the President a basis for deciding
whether an admission of responsibility as part of a request
for mercy is genuine or counterfeit. Non-admissions of guilt
(or evasive admissions of guilt) are common. Witness the
number of people (frequently in politics) who confess only
that “mistakes were made,” which, by using the passive
voice, is more a deflection than an admission of
“Public apology ceremonies are an important step toward reconciliation because
the perpetrators recognize their responsibility for the damage they’ve caused, and
it brings dignity to victims and contributes to their healing.” (footnote omitted)).
133. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Forgiveness, Mercy, and the Retributive Emotions, 7
CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 7 (1988); see also, e.g., Amitai Etzioni, Introduction, in
REPENTANCE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 125, at 1, 9 (“Those who
seek repentance must first of all show true remorse as a way of paying homage to
(i.e., recognizing the legitimacy of) both the mores they have violated and the
fellow members of the community whom they have offended. Without this
evidence, the community will not validate the offenders’ claim of being ready to
abandon their deviant conduct, mend their ways, and seek a return to
membership in the community. Furthermore, those who are not remorseful are
viewed as if they offended the community twice: once in whatever offense they
have committed and, second, in their refusal to acknowledge that mores were
violated.”); Austin Sarat, Remorse, Responsibility, and Criminal Punishment: An
Analysis of Popular Culture, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 170 (Susan A. Bandes ed.,
1999) (“[R]emorse involves a change of heart, and alteration of character.”);
Michael A. Simons, Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and
Atonement, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1, 40 (2003) (“[Repentance] represents a changing
of the self, a disassociation from the blameworthy self, that transforms the
defendant into someone who is not just less dangerous, but who is ‘better.’”).
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responsibility. 134 The explanation for the prevalence of those
false utterances is simple: genuine expressions of
wrongdoing are powerful evidence of metanoia, which
provides a strong case for clemency, but the price is
admitting responsibility, which scares off most people. That
fact invites clemency applicants to manufacture sham or
shady admissions of responsibility. It is an example of the
aphorism that hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to
virtue. 135 Given that risk, a President is entitled to demand
that an applicant proves his worthiness for the forgiveness
that clemency symbolizes by a public confession of guilt and
demonstrable proof of repentance.
Granting an offender clemency in the absence of such
proof can also poison the public effect of presidential
leniency. Consider the likely public reaction to a grant of
clemency to someone—say, a leader of ISIS—who not only
refuses to renounce and repent for his admittedly serious
crimes, but also is adamant about the legitimacy of his
actions and defiantly vows to renew his assaults on
individuals, the government, and society if he were ever to
134. See WILLIAM SAFIRE, SAFIRE’S POLITICAL DICTIONARY (rev. ed. 2008)
(describing the phrase as a “passive-evasive way of acknowledging error while
distancing the speaker from responsibility for it”); Mark Memmott, It’s True:
“Mistakes Were Made” Is the King of Non-Apologies, NPR (May 14, 2013, 1:59
PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2013/05/14/183924858/its-truemistakes-were-made-is-the-king-of-non-apologies (noting that Presidents Bill
Clinton, George W. Bush, Ronald Reagan, Ulysses Grant, and others have all
used that phrase).
135. See Harold O.J. Brown, Godly Sorrow, Sorrow of the World: Some
Christian Thoughts on Repentance, in REPENTANCE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE,
supra note 125, at 31, 34 (“Genuine repentance is rare, and sham or expedient
repentance is common. True repentance is so valuable it invites counterfeits, and
counterfeit repentance is common enough to make people suspicious of all
repentance. The value of repentance depends not on intensity of feeling, but on
sincerity and genuineness. History tells us of many ‘grand penitents,’ but also
bears witness to many hypocrites and frauds.”); John Lyden, From Sacrifice to
Sacrament: Repentance in a Christian Context, in REPENTANCE: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 125, at 43, 43 (“American society does not seem to be
one that encourages repentance. Many criminals, politicians, and other public
figures seem generally unable to acknowledge, let alone apologize for
transgressions.”).
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be released. The public reaction would be outrage, ranging
from people who doubt the wisdom of the President’s decision
to ones who assume that he either has lost his mind or
accepted a bribe in money or political support. Proof lies in
the furor that resulted when Gerald Ford pardoned Richard
Nixon, who had never publicly apologized for any illegal or
improper conduct. 136 Remember that clemency is an official
governmental action that affects the public’s attitude toward
the criminal justice system. Many would see clemency for the
unrepentant as condoning the wrongdoer’s actions, which
would undermine the necessary social commitment to lawobservance. The President should always consider this
potential adverse effect of clemency on the public when
considering individual petitions.
Pardoning the unrepentant is perilously close to
condoning his or her actions. 137 Forgiveness of the genuinely
penitent is not. Whether in private relations or in the
clemency process, forgiveness is not tantamount to
condonation, 138 which the criminal justice system must
136. See CROUCH, supra note 2, at 3–4, 25–26, 95, 108–11, 140–42. Witness also
the public reaction when Bill Clinton commuted the sentences of Puerto Rican
terrorists. See Love, Merciful, supra note 66, at 1484 (“The President defended
his decision in terms of ‘equity and fairness,’ but it was widely criticized as a
thinly-veiled attempt to curry favor with Hispanic voters in New York on behalf
of his wife’s expected Senate candidacy.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Nancy A
Youssef, Trump Intervenes in War Crimes Cases Against Three U.S. Military
Members, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 15, 2019, 10:13 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles
/trump-intervenes-in-war-crimes-cases-against-three-u-s-military-members11573865140 (“Retired Marine Gen. Charles C. Krulak, former commandant of
the Marine Corps, said the integrity of military justice is vital to maintaining
adherence to American ideals among troops. Mr. Trump’s intervention ‘betrays
these ideals and undermines decades of precedent in American military justice
that has contributed to making our country’s fighting forces the envy of the
world,’ he said.”).
137. Kolnai, supra note 130, at 95 (“Condonation means that Fred is clearly
aware of Ralph’s wrongdoing, insult, offense, or viciousness and per se
disapproves of it but deliberately refrains from any retributive response to it.”).
138. Joanna North, Wrongdoing and Forgiveness, 62 PHILOSOPHY 499, 500
(1987) (“What is annulled in the act of forgiveness is not the crime itself but the
distorting effect that this wrong has upon one’s relations with the wrongdoer and
perhaps with others.”).
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steadfastly avoid. Condonation would undercut the ability of
the criminal justice system to substitute public justice for
private vengeance; it would signal political weakness or
favoritism to the offender; and it would represent moral
indifference to the plight of his victims. 139 No chief executive
should accept those outcomes, and the Pardon Clause does
not require him to do so.
In sum, clemency is appropriate for someone who
recognizes the error of his ways, who both publicly and
sincerely renounces past illegal conduct, who tries to offset
the harms from his crimes, and who seeks forgiveness. 140 By
sincerely acknowledging and renouncing past wrongdoing—
admitting the commission of a crime and expressing remorse
for it—a person can divorce himself from his act and prove
that he is someone “new.” 141 At a minimum, a President can
reasonably so conclude.

139. Kolnai, supra note 130, at 97–98 (noting that condonation of wrongdoing
“is an intrinsically bad thing” and threatens to foster it, rather than eradicate it);
id. at 103 (also observing that forgiving someone who has not undergone a change
of heart can “encourage him to persist in his line of wrongdoing with which he
appears to have got away so cheaply”); id. at 105 (“[W]here depravity and malice
hold sway they may all too easily draw nurture from a good-natured approach
and batten on forgiveness.”).
140. Remember the story of the Prodigal Son. Luke 15:11–32. There, a son, who
left home and led a profligate life, returned to his father, and confessed to him,
saying “I have sinned against heaven, and in thy sight, and am no more worthy
to be called thy son.” Id. 15:21. Overjoyed that his son had both returned home
and expressed repentance, the father forgave him, exclaiming that, “for this my
son was dead, and is alive again; he was lost, and is found.” Id. 15:24.
141. See Calhoun, supra note 130, at 81 (“In breaking the connection between
her wrongdoing and her true self, the reformed person ceases to be an appropriate
object of resentment.”); Murphy, supra note 133, at 7 (“There are various ways in
which the proper divorce can come about, but the clearest way in which a
wrongdoer can sever himself from part wrong is through sincere repentance. In
having a sincere change of heart, he is withdrawing his endorsement from his
own immoral past behavior; he is saying ‘I no longer stand behind the wrongdoing
and want to be separated from it; I stand with you in condemning it’.”).
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D. Would a Pardon Bring the Criminal Justice System into
Disrepute?
The next question looks in a different direction than the
others. Rather than focusing on the potential recipient, it
asks what effect a pardon would have on the public and the
administration of justice. That is an important consideration
for every President to have in mind. A pardon may resemble
an act of personal forgiveness, but it is not. 142 As Justice
Holmes wrote, it is the government’s formal decision not to
exact the full measure of punishment that the law allows. 143
When issuing a pardon, the President acts as a government
official, and his decision to grant clemency has legal and
practical effects on both the recipient and the public. 144 The
President has the obligation to consider the effect of his
decision on the enforcement of the criminal law. 145 Not only
must a President refrain from selling pardons and
dispensing them to friends and allies like Christmas
presents, but he must also exercise his authority in a
responsible manner to give the appearance he is acting
impartially. Like it or not, the President must consider the
effect that a pardon will have on the public and its attitude
toward the criminal justice system.
Start with the victims of federal offenses. 146 For much of
142. Speaking after the work of the post-Apartheid South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, Archbishop Desmond Tutu defined forgiveness as
follows: “Forgiveness means abandoning your right to pay back that perpetrator
in his own coin, but it is a loss that liberates the victim.” DESMOND TUTU, NO
FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS 272 (1999).
143. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1926); supra text accompanying
note 53.
144. See Horsbrugh, supra note 74, at 270.
145. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (Take Care Clause).
146. Each state outlaws common law offenses such as murder, rape, robbery,
burglary, which have immediate and obvious victims. The problem is more
complicated in the case of federal offenses. Unlike the states, Congress does not
possess a general “police power,” so Congress must tie legislation to one or more
provisions of Article I. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995). A
variety of federal crimes—such as defrauding a private party by using the mail
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our history, we relegated victims to the status of Victorian
Era children: people who should be seen but not heard. 147
Thankfully, that era is behind us. No federal court may
ignore the interests of victims, 148 and the President should
not either. Although he cannot avoid the responsibility that
comes with the need to make clemency decisions in the public
interest—as one-time President and one-time Chief Justice
William Howard Taft explained—he should ensure that
victims have the opportunity to be heard. 149
The President also needs to consider the effect of
clemency on the public, a requirement that is at least implicit
in the opinions of Chief Justice Taft and Associate Justice
Holmes. Public perception that the criminal law and the
system that enforces it are illegitimate can lead the public to
become reluctant (and in some cases to refuse altogether) to
assist law enforcement or to comply with the laws

or violent crimes committed on federal property—have direct victims too, but
many—such as defrauding the federal government or cybercrimes against
government facilities—do not. Other federal offenses—such as drug trafficking—
might have only a small number of direct victims (for example, people shot by
drug dealers), but have a very large number of indirect victims (for example,
innocent residents of neighborhoods infested with rival drug-trafficking gangs).
See STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS, AMERICA’S LONGEST WAR: RETHINKING
OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS 11 (1993) (“Under prohibition, the innocent
suffer at every turn. The users of illegal drugs do not bear even a fraction of the
economic and social costs of their drug use; the nonuser bears a large portion: in
unsafe streets, overcrowded, expensive prisons, diluted law-enforcement
resources, hospital emergency rooms filled beyond capacity and inner cities
becoming unlivable.”).
147. See Larkin, Crack Cocaine, supra note 7, at 281–94.
148. See Scott Campbell et al. Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771; The
Victims of Crime Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 10601 (2019); Morris v. Slappy, 461
U.S. 1, 14 (1983) (“[I]n the administration of criminal justice, courts may not
ignore the concerns of victims.”); see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827
(1991) (rejecting a per se rule against the introduction of victim impact
statements at the sentencing stage of capital cases); William F. McDonald,
Towards a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal Justice: The Return of the Victim,
13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649, 649–50 (1976).
149. See generally Jill Stauffer, A Hearing: Forgiveness, Resentment and
Recovery in Law, 30 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 517 (2012) (arguing that survivors need
to be heard and that others need to listen).

2022]

FOCUSING PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY

57

themselves. 150 Clemency is not exempt from that risk. 151
Public belief that clemency is a reward, not for average
people who have admitted their wrongdoing, turned their life
around, and asked for forgiveness, but for political cronies,
financial supporters, long-time friends, individuals with
political connections, and the haute monde will corrode
public respect for the law. It will generate the belief that
criminal law ostensibly serves as a broad, facially neutral
protection for the public, but that the criminal justice system
implementing that law contains escape hatches available
only to the powerful, rich, or anointed. We have already seen
that (quite justifiable, in my opinion) reaction in the case of
clemency grants made by former Presidents Clinton and
George W. Bush. 152 Other examples are Trump’s decision to
pardon former sheriff Joe Arpaio’s conviction for criminal
contempt for violating a federal court order prohibiting the
unlawful treatment of prisoners and suspected illegal aliens,

150. See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 178 (2006) (concluding
that people generally follow the law because they respect it, not because they fear
it); PETER C. YEAGER, THE LIMITS OF LAW: THE PUBLIC REGULATION OF PRIVATE
POLLUTION 9 (1991) (“As criminologists have long known, where laws lack
legitimacy, violation rates are likely to be relatively high, other factors held
constant.”). Cheshire Calhoun’s remarks in the case of forgiving an unrepentant
party for private wrongdoing are directly on point:
Culpable wrongdoers are the problem. For them, not responding resentfully
may seem to send a condoning message: ‘the act was not wrong’, or
‘wrongdoing will not be penalized’, or ‘I am not the other’s moral equal, so
that in this case the act does not count as moral mistreatment’. In sending
any one of these messages, one fails to prevent repetitions and may well
encourage them. As a result of doing nothing to improve the wrongdoer’s
character, both oneself and others remain at risk of future mistreatment.
Worse yet, the condoning messages might have a wider audience. All who
witness the lack of resentment may take it as a green light to misbehavior.
Calhoun, supra note 130, at 84 (footnote omitted).
151. See, e.g., MINOW, LAW’S FORGIVENESS, supra note 70, at 128–36.
152. See, e.g., BIBAS, supra note 66, at 24; Alschuler, supra note 15, at 1168
(“In 1215, the Magna Carta declared, ‘To no one will we sell, to none will we deny
or delay, right or justice.’ In the administration of President Bill Clinton, the
charter’s pledge was broken.” (footnote omitted)); Love, Pardon Twilight, supra
note 5, at 1212.
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as well as the slew of pardons he issued to political loyalists
as he was walking out the door. 153
To be sure, any grant of clemency poses some risk of
encouraging misconduct if it gives the public the impression
that the law favors the rich, well connected, or powerful
interests in society, and we certainly do not want to
encourage that belief. Some grants of clemency, however, are
more likely to engender that suspicion than others. Public
cooperation is essential if the criminal law is to be effective,
and public respect for the criminal justice system is critical
for the public to cooperate with the police and prosecutors.
Because there is no erasing a clemency grant issued for the
wrong reasons, and little corrective for a public attitude that
one or more grants were corruptly motivated, a President
must be especially careful to avoid leaving the public with
the impression that he acted with favoritism in mind.
Does that mean the President should never pardon
someone who worked in his administration or someone he
knows personally? No. A President should not leave a
conviction in place if the applicant is innocent or deserves a
pardon because he has paid his debt to society and has
reformed. 154 At the same time, the President must
demonstrate to the public that he will pardon anyone who fits
into those categories, not merely the people who have
benefitted, supported, or befriended him. He must prove that
clemency is available, to quote former Justice Department
Pardon Attorney Margaret Love, for “ordinary people.” 155 He
must persuade people he will never meet, who have never
helped him, who will never be in a position to assist him, and
who, in fact, voted against him, that he is willing to forgive
what they did too.
153. See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text.
154. The same point holds true in the case of commutations. A President also
should not allow someone to endure an unconscionable punishment, because a
prior relationship between him and her might suggest that he granted clemency
for an illegitimate reason.
155. Love, Pardon Twilight, supra note 5, at 1175.
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To prove that he is a person of character, the President
must use his or her clemency power regularly, not just at
Christmas, and widely, not just for celebrities. To persuade
the average person that he or she matters, the President
must award relief to average people and must do so often.
Once or twice is a faux display of generosity of spirit.
Regularly doing so demonstrates sincerity. If the President
does that, he will be able to explain the occasional grant of
relief to someone whom he does know without arousing
public ire that he rewards only friends.
E. Is There a Statecraft Justification for a Pardon?
The last question does not arise out of the operation of
the criminal justice system. Instead, it stems from the need
to manage the nation’s foreign policy or to bring to a close
severe domestic turmoil. There is an ancient practice of
granting clemency for reasons of state. 156 Kings, military
rulers, and democratically elected chief executives manage
the operation of government in both foreign and domestic
spheres. In so doing, they might find that the nation’s
interests require that a just conviction or sentence be
excused because the nation’s overall interests outweigh the
need to punish a lawfully convicted criminal. A President
might find clemency appropriate even for a clearly guilty
offender or one who received precisely the punishment that
156. See, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, *398 (noting that clemency can
“endear the sovereign to his subjects, and contribute more than any thing to root
in their hearts that filial affection and personal loyalty which are the sure
establishment of a prince”); COKE, supra note 2, at 233 (“Mercy and truth
preserve the king, and by clemency is his throne strengthened.”); CHARLES L.
GRISWOLD, FORGIVENESS: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATION xviii n.10 (2007) (noting
Julius Caesar granted clemency to some nations that he conquered); Kathleen M.
Ridolfi, Not Just an Act of Mercy: The Demise of Post-Conviction Relief and a
Rightful Claim to Clemency, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 43, 50 (1998) (“[A]n
executive pardon would allow the President to heal the country in times of civil
unrest, thereby protecting national security.”); Jay Cost, In Praise of Gerald Ford,
NAT’L REV. (Sept. 9, 2019, 6:30 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/09
/gerald-ford-pardon-richard-nixon-deserves-praise/ (praising President Gerald
Ford for pardoning Richard Nixon to end the domestic turmoil over Watergate).
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any reasonable person would deem just for reasons having
nothing to do with that offender, his crime, or his trial,
entirely because of geopolitics.
The occasions when the President must answer this
question fortunately arise only infrequently. They stem from
instances when a pardon is necessary to reconcile different
quarreling political factions, to quiet severe domestic
turmoil, or to exchange prisoners with a foreign nation.
When those scenarios arise, the only satisfactory resolution
may require the President to grant a pardon, or sometimes a
commutation, to one or more of a small number of
individuals, or to declare an amnesty covering a far larger
number of people. 157
The Founders recognized the need for the President to
use his pardon power to advance the nation’s interests. 158
Presidents from George Washington through George H.W.
Bush granted clemency to resolve political turmoil. 159 George
Washington granted amnesty to participants in the Whiskey
Rebellion, and John Adams did the same for participants in
Fries Rebellion, both of which were tax-related revolts.
Thomas Jefferson pardoned everyone convicted of violating
157. See Larkin, Revitalizing Clemency, supra note 5, at 850 n.55.
158. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, at 447 (Andrew Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (“[I]n seasons of insurrection of rebellion, there are often critical
moments, when a well-timed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may
restore the tranquility of the commonwealth.”); James Iredell, North Carolina
Ratifying Convention, reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 17–18 (Philip
B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 2001) (noting the usefulness of the pardon power
during civil war and to protect spies useful to the government).
159. See, e.g., EDWARD CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787–
1984, at 181 (Randall W. Bland et al. eds., 5th rev. ed. 1984); CROUCH, supra note
2, at 40–45, 55–56; Proclamation by John Adams, President of the United States,
in 1 A COMPILATION OF MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at
293, 293–94 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897); Love, Pardon Twilight, supra note
5, at 1173 (“Presidents since Thomas Jefferson have issued post-war pardons to
deserters and draft evaders.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 1173 n.16 (collecting
cases); Love, DOJ Conflict of Interest, supra note 14, at 104 nn.79–80; Love,
Reinventing Pardons, supra note 69, at 6 & nn.6–8; Ruckman, 21st Century,
supra note 5, at 453–56. See generally Charles Shanor & Marc Miller, Pardon Us:
Systematic Pardons, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 139 (2001).
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the Sedition Act. 160 James Madison pardoned smuggler and
pirate Jean Lafitte (and his Baratarian Pirates) for assisting
Andrew Jackson during the defense of New Orleans in the
War of 1812. James Buchanan pardoned Brigham Young,
founder of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,
and others involved in the Utah War of 1857–1858.
Recognizing the strategic value of clemency in his relations
with the Indian Tribes, Abraham Lincoln commuted the
death sentences of 265 Sioux tribesmen involved in an
uprising. During the Civil War, Lincoln pardoned soldiers on
the Union side to boost morale, and soldiers of the
Confederacy to regain their allegiance. 161 Andrew Johnson
extended Lincoln’s work by pardoning Jefferson Davis, the
former President of the Confederacy, along with other
officers of the Confederacy. Henry Harrison and Grover
Cleveland pardoned polygamists in Utah. 162 Teddy Roosevelt
pardoned participants in the Philippine Insurrection of
1899–1902. Calvin Coolidge granted pardons to World War I
deserters. Warren Harding commuted the sentences of
people convicted of sedition, espionage, or interfering with
military recruitment, such as Eugene Debs. Harry Truman
granted pardons to service members with pre-World War II
convictions who served honorably during that war. John F.
Kennedy commuted the sentence imposed on Soviet spy
Rudolph Abel so that he could be exchanged for U-2 pilot
Francis Gary Powers, who had been shot down while flying
over the USSR. 163 Gerald Ford pardoned Richard Nixon for
160. See Duker, supra note 2, at 516; Easterbrook, supra note 108, at 909.
161. Proclamation No. 11, 13 Stat. 737 (Dec. 8, 1863); Proclamation No. 14, 13
Stat. 747 (Mar. 26, 1864); Ruckman, Seasonal Clemency, supra note 5, at 26; P.S.
Ruckman, Jr. & David Kincaid, Inside Lincoln’s Clemency Decision Making, 29
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 84, 84 (1999).
162. Proclamation No. 37, 13 Stat. 758 (May 29, 1865); Proclamation No. 3, 15
Stat. 699 (Sept. 7, 1867); Proclamation No. 6, 15 Stat. 702 (July 4, 1868);
Proclamation No. 15, 15 Stat. 711 (Dec. 25, 1868); see Duker, supra note 2, at
511–15.
163. See Hollow Nickel/Rudolph Abel, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://
www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/hollow-nickel-rudolph-abel/ (last visited Jan.
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any crime he might have committed in connection with
Watergate to allow the nation to put that episode in the rear
view mirror, which could not have happened if Nixon had
been tried. 164 Ford and Jimmy Carter granted amnesty to
Vietnam War draft evaders and military deserters. 165 Ronald
Reagan granted clemency to Russian spies so that they could
be exchanged for American prisoners. 166 Finally, George
H.W. Bush pardoned the parties involved in the Iran-Contra
arms-for-hostages controversy to end that imbroglio. 167
Several of those actions were controversial and hotly
criticized at the time, especially Ford’s pardon of Nixon.
Whatever the merits of those decisions, from time-to-time
Presidents will need to act as the head of a nation, rather
than the chief federal law enforcement officer. When they do,
clemency might be the most appropriate response to a
national problem.

22, 2022); see Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 221–25 (1960). The story was
depicted in the 2015 film Bridge of Spies. See BRIDGE OF SPIES (DreamWorks
Pictures 2015).
164. See CROUCH, supra note 2, at 66–85. The immediate public reaction to
Ford’s decision likely cost him the election in 1976, but history has generally
concluded that Ford made the right move. See MINOW, LAW’S FORGIVENESS, supra
note 70, at 119–20 (noting change in public attitude to “a majority approval by
1986”); Carter, supra note 66, at 887.
165. Proclamation No. 4,313, 39 Fed. Reg. 33,293, 33,293–95 (Sept. 17, 1974),
reprinted in 88 Stat. 2504 (1974) (as amended by Proclamation No. 4,345, 40 Fed.
Reg. 4,893 (Feb. 3, 1975), reprinted in 89 Stat. 1236 (1975)); Proclamation No.
4,483, 42 Fed. Reg. 4,391, 4,391–92 (Jan. 24, 1977), reprinted in 91 Stat. 1719
(1977) (pardoning persons who may have committed any offense between August
4, 1964 and March 28, 1973 in violation of the Military Selective Service Act); see
Kent Greenawalt, Vietnam Amnesty—Problems of Justice and Line-Drawing, 11
GA. L. REV. 1, 2, 7–8 (1976).
166. See George E. Curry, U.S. Swaps 4 Spies For 25 Prisoners, CHI. TRIB.,
June 12, 1985 (§ 1), at 3.
167. See Proclamation No. 6,518, 57 Fed. Reg. 62,145, 62,145–47 (Dec. 30,
1992).
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III. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO COMMUTATION DECISIONMAKING: A CATEGORY-BY-CATEGORY APPROACH
Turn back to the text of the Pardon Clause.
Interestingly, the text does not empower the President to
commute an offender’s sentence, only to delay or excuse it.
Yet that fact is inconsequential. Logically speaking, the
greater power to excuse an offense in its entirety includes the
lesser power to leave a conviction in place but reduce the
punishment imposed on the offender. 168 Chief executives
have commuted sentences for probably as long as there have
been chief executives, 169 and the Supreme Court has
expressly upheld that practice. 170 Moreover, the ordinary
retort to any greater-includes-the-lesser argument—viz.,
that no one should be free to use the greater power in a
discriminatory manner—is only obliquely relevant here.
Discrimination is impermissible in the exercise of either
power. Accordingly, the issue is not whether the President
can commute a sentence, but how should he go about
deciding whether to do so. The sections below address that
issue.

168. See RONALD L. GOLDFARB & LINDA R. SINGER, AFTER CONVICTION 343
(1973) (“[P]resumably the [commutation] power is simply a lesser form of pardon.
The power to commute sentences has been held to be implicit in the general grant
of the pardoning power in the states whose constitutions do not mention
commutation and in the federal system.”). The principal objection to any greaterincludes-the-lesser argument is that equal-treatment principles require like
cases to be treated alike. In the case of the Pardon Clause, that principle requires
only that the President act in a non-arbitrary manner.
169. See id. at 343–43 (“Mostly, [commutation] is used to allow prisoners with
terminal illnesses to die out of prison, to make prisoners eligible for parole and
to avoid capital punishment.”).
170. See Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 266 (1974) (“The plain purpose of the
broad power conferred by [Article II, Section 2, Clause 1], was to allow plenary
authority in the President to ‘forgive’ the convicted person in part or entirely, to
reduce a penalty in terms of a specified number of years, or to alter it with
conditions which are in themselves constitutionally unobjectionable.”); Biddle v.
Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927) (quoted supra in text accompanying note 53).
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A. The Choice Between Case-by-Case and Category-Wide
Decision-Making
Commutation requests raise issues that materially differ
from the ones involved by a pardon request. Atop the reasons
given above is this crucial difference: pardons focus on one
offender and his crime; commutations, on one offender and
his sentence, when compared against other similarly situated
offenders and their punishments. Those differences call for a
very different approach than the one I discussed above for
pardons.
Consider how former President Barack Obama
approached this problem in the “Clemency Initiative 2014.”
He believed that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 171 imposed
draconian punishments on offenders guilty of selling crack
cocaine. In response, he directed Attorney General Eric
Holder to implement a program allowing him to decide
whether to commute the sentences imposed on drug
traffickers and, if so, by how much. The evidence strongly
suggests, however, that Obama simply delegated decisionmaking to subordinate officials at the Justice Department
and in the White House Counsel’s Office. 172 Obama might

171. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified
at 21 U.S.C. § 841 (amended 2010)).
172. See Larkin, Delegating Clemency, supra note 11, at 267 (“Obama acted on
more than 27,000 clemency petitions during his presidency. In how many cases
did he make what amounts to a resentencing decision himself, rather than
delegate those decisions to others down the clemency food chain? [¶] Consider the
clemency data for October 2016 through January 20, 2017. Obama granted 1043
commutations, denied 4864 commutation petitions, and granted 221 pardons.
That amounts to 6128 clemency decisions, approximately 1532 petitions per
month or 51 each day. If you count just the grants, that comes to about 9.3 each
day. Does anyone really think that Obama read 9 clemency memoranda, let alone
files, each day during that four-month period? I doubt it. Of course, maybe a fourmonth period is too short. If so, let’s put the starting date back to January 2016,
when a new lawyer became the Pardon Attorney. The number of days to make
6128 clemency decisions now becomes 385, which reduces the daily number to
just below 16, or 2.7 if we count only commutation cases. Does anyone really think
that Obama read 2 to 3 clemency memoranda (or files) each day during that near
thirteen-month period, let alone 16? I doubt that too.” (footnote omitted)).
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have actually signed commutation warrants (or directed
someone else to use his autopen), but that does not mean he
independently evaluated clemency petitions. He likely just
went along with the recommendations he received from
others, perhaps without any deliberation. 173 It is doubtful
that the Framers had that process in mind when they vested
the President with the clemency power. 174
173. Id. at 268 (“The President has the power to revise every sentence imposed
in federal district court; the Pardon Clause does not cap the number of
commutations that a President may grant. But it would be a mistake to act in
that manner. Obama’s decision to do so exposed what, as a practical matter,
happened in that scenario: He delegated his clemency power to subordinates,
perhaps even Assistant U.S. Attorneys. Evidence for that conclusion can be seen
in the fact that offenders did not always receive a ‘Get Out of Jail Free’ card along
with their commutation. A goodly number simply had some portion of their
sentence shaved off—say, from life imprisonment plus 30 years to 30 years’
imprisonment. It is difficult to believe that Obama made those decisions himself.
If that is how Obama wanted release decisions to be made, there was another
vehicle for him to use. He could have directed the Federal Bureau of Prisons to
ask district court judges to reconsider a prisoner’s sentence under a federal
statute authorizing such ‘second looks’ in some circumstances, as former Pardon
Attorney Margaret Love has argued. At a minimum, that approach would have
had the virtue of honesty. It also would have relied on the experience of people
who sentence offenders for a living.” (footnotes omitted)).
174. Id. (“The Framers granted the President the power to grant clemency in
Article II because they believed that one person, the nation’s chief executive,
should be responsible for making that decision. The President’s clemency power
is found in the same part of Article II as his Commander-in-Chief power and the
power to demand opinions from his principal lieutenants, neither of which is
subject to review by Congress or any other official. By contrast, the President’s
powers to make treaties and to appoint ambassadors, consuls, and other federal
officers are subject to the ‘advice and consent’ of the Senate. That is important
because it signals that he is to make those decisions, not someone else. [¶] The
flip side of the fact that the President’s clemency power is his alone to exercise is
that it is his alone to exercise. The President must make that decision—not the
Attorney General, not the Deputy Attorney General (to whom Attorney General
Griffin Bell delegated final decision-making responsibility for the Justice
Department), not the Pardon Attorney, not a U.S. Attorney, and not an Assistant
U.S. Attorney. It is difficult to believe that the Framers would have approved a
President’s decision to delegate his Commander-in-Chief power to a subordinate
civilian official or military officer. If the nation were to prosecute a war, the one
person responsible for its outcome was to be the one person whom the entire
nation elected to office. If so, the Framers must have decided to treat the
President’s clemency power in the same manner because it is found in the same
section and paragraph of Article II. If the nation were to admit a mistake or
bestow mercy, it should be the one person who could speak for the nation. And if
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The Framers empowered the President to grant
clemency because they believed that the remedy was
necessary, that only one person should have that power, and
that the chief executive was best suited to exercise it on
behalf of the nation. 175 It is unlikely that the Framers
intended to allow the President to delegate that
responsibility to others. The text of Article II lodges the
President’s clemency power in the same clause and section of
that article as the Commander-in-Chief power. 176 By
contrast, the President’s powers to make treaties and to
appoint federal officers are subject to the “Advice and
Consent” of the Senate. 177 It is difficult to believe that the
Framers would have approved a President’s decision to
delegate the Commander-in-Chief power to a subordinate
civilian official or military officer. If the nation were to
prosecute a war, the one person responsible for its outcome
was to be the one person whom the entire nation elected to
office. If so, the Framers must have decided to treat the
President’s clemency power in the same manner, because
both are found in the same clause and section of Article II. If
the nation were to admit a mistake or bestow mercy, it
should be the one person who could speak for the nation. And
if that is true, then the President cannot delegate his
clemency power to someone below him in the chain-ofcommand.
Accordingly, only the President may make the decision
to grant clemency—not the Attorney General, not the Deputy
Attorney General (to whom Attorney General Griffin Bell
delegated final decision-making responsibility for the Justice
Department), not the Pardon Attorney, not a US Attorney,
that is true, then the President cannot delegate his clemency power to someone
below him in the chain-of-command. It may be the case, however, that Obama
did just that.” (footnotes omitted)).
175. THE FEDERALIST No. 74, at 473 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
176. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2., cl. 1.
177. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2., cl. 2.
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and not an Assistant US Attorney. 178 Moreover, the
President should make those decisions in a manner that
persuades the public that he or she actually made the call,
rather than just formally but reflexively ratifying a decision
made by others.
Obama was certainly correct that the President might
consider each commutation request on its own and forgo
making class-wide judgments about the types of offenders
who deserve relief. Commutations, like pardons, are
generally awarded to particular offenders for reasons
peculiar to each specific case. Historically speaking, that is
how Presidents have awarded clemency, and doing so makes
sense. There might often be occasions where there is a “gap”
between a lawful sentence and a just one, or between a
legally just sentence and a morally just one. 179 That likely
would be particularly common when mandatory minimum
sentences tie a judge’s hands—the very type of punishments
that President Obama sought to address in his Clemency
Initiative 2014. Case-by-case decision-making is one way,
imperfect though it is, to soften the sharp, unyielding edges
of legislatively fixed sentences.
Nevertheless, Obama would have been wrong to think
that he could use only that approach. 180 Nothing in the text
178. As President Obama appears to have done. Larkin, Delegating Clemency,
supra note 11, at 268.
179. See Smart, supra note 75, at 353 (“I think that, if a judge conscientiously
examined every case before him, and, where the law was too crude and inflexible
to bridge the gap between legal and moral justice, exercised mercy, we would
probably regard him as a very humane and merciful judge.”).
180. Obama never explained why he chose a case-by-case approach, although
Attorney General Loretta Lynch said that the President lacks the authority to
engage in “mass” clemency. She was clearly wrong (or she lied). See P.S.
Ruckman, Jr., Creepy Cloud of Error/Ignorance in the Air, PARDON POWER (Jan.
5, 2017), http://www.pardonpower.com/search?updated-max=2017-01-13T22:30:
00-06:00&max-results=20&start=20&by-date=false
[https://perma.cc/6TQ7QQPX] (“Recently, U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch appeared on the Rachel
Maddow Show and said the granting of a pardon is ‘an individual decision that’s
made on a case-by-case basis.’ Consequently, ‘There’s no legal framework or
regulatory framework that allows for a pardon of a group en masse.’ The
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of the Pardon Clause bars a President from making categorywide commutations, the history of clemency places no
roadblock in that path, and Presidents have awarded relief
to large groups of offenders. George Washington granted
amnesty to the members of the Whiskey Rebellion. Abraham
Lincoln and Andrew Johnson forgave the soldiers who fought
for the Confederacy during the Civil War. Gerald Ford and
Jimmy Carter granted amnesty to Americans who
successfully evaded the Vietnam War-era draft. 181 The
Supreme Court has also approved that practice. The
distinction between “pardon” and “amnesty,” the Court noted
in Knote v. United States, “is one rather of philological
interest than of legal importance.” 182 In United States v.
Klein, the Court wrote that “[p]ardon includes amnesty.” 183
Accordingly, there is no persuasive argument that a
President may consider commutation petitions only on a
case-by-case basis.
President Trump seems to have made clemency decisions
on just such a case-by-case basis. From all that appears,
however, he did not act in any type of systematic manner.
Rather than rely on recommendations offered by the Pardon
Attorney or other Justice Department officials, Trump has
chosen to listen to family members, celebrities, or other
people he knew or saw on television. 184 He commuted the lifeimprisonment sentence of Alice Marie Johnson at the behest
of his son-in-law (and presidential advisor) Jared Kushner,
his daughter Ivanka, and Kim Kardashian West, a television
statement was, of course, a preposterous blunder. Amnesties and group pardons
are a great American tradition.”).
181. Larkin, Revitalizing Clemency, supra note 5, at 850 n.55.
182. 95 U.S. 149, 153 (1877).
183. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1872).
184. See Josh Blackman, Collateral Damage: The Arpaio Pardon and
Separation of Powers, LAWFARE (Aug. 30, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://www.lawfare
blog.com/collateral-damage-arpaio-pardon-and-separation-powers;
Margaret
Colgate Love, War Crimes, Pardons and the Attorney General, LAWFARE (May 22,
2019, 6:42 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/war-crimes-pardons-and-attorneygeneral.
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celebrity. 185 Agreeing with the views of two White House
advisors, Stephen Bannon and Stephen Miller, Trump
pardoned former Arizona sheriff Joe Arpaio. 186 After
Sylvester Stallone interceded on behalf of deceased
heavyweight boxing champion Jack Johnson, Trump
pardoned Johnson for violating the Mann Act by
transporting his girlfriend across state lines. 187 Trump
pardoned Scooter Libby, formerly the chief-of-staff for Vice
President Dick Cheney, convicted of perjury and obstruction
of justice, perhaps because of the intervention of certain
Washington, D.C., lawyers whom Trump unsuccessfully had
sought to retain in connection with the Mueller
Investigation. 188 For most of Trump’s presidency, there
seemed to be neither rhyme nor reason to his clemency
decisions. 189 Granting clemency because someone has an “in”
at the White House allows cronyism to become the
dispositive factor, not justice, not mercy. That might not be
a “corrupt” exercise of the President’s clemency power, a
185. See Brian Bennett, How Unlikely Allies Got Prison Reform Done—With
an Assist from Kim Kardashian West, TIME (Dec. 21, 2018, 3:57 PM),
http://time.com/5486560/prison-reform-jared-kushner-kim-kardashian-west/.
186. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Maggie Haberman, Trump Pardons Joe
Arpaio, Who Became Face of Crackdown on Illegal Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/25/us/politics/joe-arpaio-trumppardon-sheriff-arizona.html.
187. See John Eligon & Michael D. Shear, Trump Pardons Jack Johnson,
Heavyweight Boxing Champion, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes
.com/2018/05/24/sports/jack-johnson-pardon-trump.html. The Mann Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2421–2424, makes it a federal crime to transport a woman in interstate
commerce for prostitution or “any other immoral purpose.” Johnson was black;
his girlfriend, white.
188. See Peter Baker, Trump Pardons Scooter Libby in a Case that Mirrors His
Own, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/13/us
/politics/trump-pardon-scooter-libby.html (“Victoria Toensing, a lawyer and
friend of Mr. Libby’s, said on Friday that she brought his case to the attention of
the White House Counsel’s Office over the summer. Ms. Toensing and her
husband and law partner, Joseph diGenova, were briefly set to work for Mr.
Trump as private lawyers last month until they backed out, citing a client
conflict.”).
189. Not everyone has such a relatively benign characterization of Trump’s
pardons. See sources cited supra notes 18–20.
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calumny often thrown around these days, but it is not the
way to run the railroad. 190
B. Potential Commutation Categories
If the President were to use a category-wide approach,
how would that work? What would the categories be? What
categories define different types of sentences? Some
categories come readily to mind.
1. Capital Punishment
Capital cases naturally define a separate category. That
certainly is true as a matter of biology. As Justice Holmes
once wrote, “By common understanding imprisonment for
life is a less penalty than death.” 191 It also is true as a matter
of history. English kings, state governors, and Presidents
have always treated capital sentences differently. They have
reduced death sentences to life imprisonment, with or
without the possibility of parole, for centuries. 192 Recently,
190. Love, Pardon Twilight, supra note 5, at 1171–72 (“It would be bad enough
if Presidents had made a conscious choice not to pardon at all or to make only
occasional symbolic use of their constitutional power. But what makes current
federal pardoning practice intolerable is that as the official route to clemency has
all but closed, the back-door route has opened wide. In the two administrations
that preceded Obama’s, petitioners with personal or political connections to the
presidency bypassed the pardon bureaucracy in the Department of Justice,
disregarded its regulations, and obtained clemency by means (and sometimes on
grounds) not available to the less privileged. The Department of Justice invited
these end runs by refusing to take seriously its responsibilities as Presidential
advisor in clemency matters, by exposing President Clinton to charges of
cronyism, and then President Bush to charges of incompetence. The two
Presidents are also at fault: in confirming popular beliefs about pardon’s
irregularity and unfairness, they disserved both the institution of the presidency
and their own legacies.”). The concerns discussed above regarding pardons that
bring discredit on the clemency process apply fully to commutations.
191. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 487 (1927).
192. The issue arose often at common law. Death was the mandatory
punishment for felonies, and the common law did not always recognize defenses
such as infancy or grounds for a reprieve such as pregnancy or mental
incompetency. See, e.g., RANKIN, supra note 2, at 121; Larkin, Pardoning
Mistakes, supra note 109, at 664. The President can reduce a death sentence to
life without parole even when the only alternative punishment is life with the

2022]

FOCUSING PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY

71

several governors, usually as they are walking out the door,
have decided to empty death row. They have offered different
reasons for doing so. 193 In some cases, the governor
commuted death sentences to remedy trial errors. 194 Illinois
Governor George Ryan defended a mass commutation on the
ground that the Illinois criminal justice system was so
riddled with system-wide flaws that he lacked confidence in
the state’s ability to convict only the guilty. 195 Other
governors have acted for reasons of personal ethics. New
Mexico Governor Toney Anaya, for instance, commuted
every death row sentence on the ground that he was morally
opposed to capital punishment. 196 Whatever the rationale,
Presidents could put capital cases into a category by
themselves. 197
2. Life Imprisonment
Recently, some commentators have argued that
contemporary society should eliminate not only capital
punishment, but also sentences of life imprisonment,
possibility of parole. See Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 267 (1974). Several
Supreme Court cases have arisen out of the grant or denial of a commutation
petition. See Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 275 (1998);
Perovich, 274 U.S. at 486.
193. See, e.g., Michael L. Radelet & Barbara A. Zsembik, Executive Clemency
in Post-Furman Capital Cases, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 289, 299–303, 300 tbl.2 (1993).
194. See Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21–22 (1975); Radelet & Zsembik, supra
note 193, at 293–96, 297 tbl.1.
195. See Closing Remarks by Former Illinois Governor George Ryan,
Presentation, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1719, 1727, 1733–34 (2004) (from Race to
Execution Symposium).
196. See Toney Anaya, Statement by Toney Anaya on Capital Punishment, 27
U. RICH. L. REV. 177, 177 (1993) (“I commuted the death sentences of all those on
‘death row’ in the New Mexico State Penitentiary. I have consistently opposed
capital punishment as being inhumane, immoral, anti-God, and incompatible
with an enlightened society.”).
197. Whether clearing out death row is a wise judgment is a different issue.
Commuting a capital sentence, however, is always a politically controversial act.
For examples of the different views, see generally, Stephen P. Garvey, Is It Wrong
to Commute Death Row? Retribution, Atonement, and Mercy, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1319
(2004); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The Demise of Capital Clemency, 73 WASH. & LEE. L.
REV. 1295 (2016).
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particularly life without the possibility of parole, known in
the lingo as “LWOP.” 198 Some commentators could include as
“life” sentences any punishment that, by its terms, would
force a prisoner to die in custody, as well as any sentence that
has the practical effect of confining a prisoner for the
remainder of his expected natural life. Sentences of one
hundred (or more) year’s imprisonment, as well as any
sentence that would reach beyond the average life
expectancy of a particular offender, would qualify as “life”
imprisonment. Constitutional law permits those sentences to
be imposed on adults. The Supreme Court has expressly held
that a sentence of life imprisonment is not a cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment
when imposed on adult offenders, 199 and that a legislature
can mandate life imprisonment by statute, without regard to
the mitigating factors present in a particular case. 200 Several
federal offenses, such as first-degree murder, treason, and
large-scale drug trafficking, can result in a LWOP
sentence. 201 A President inclined to believe that no one is
beyond redemption might put LWOP sentences in the same
category as capital punishment.
3. Offenses Where No Imprisonment Is Justified
A third category would be cases where the President
concludes that no term of imprisonment is appropriate. As
discussed above, the criminal law has historically limited its
reach to offenses that display moral blameworthiness, which
198. See generally, e.g., MARC MAUER & ASHLEY NELLIS, THE MEANING OF LIFE:
THE CASE FOR ABOLISHING LIFE SENTENCES (2018); LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE:
AMERICA’S NEW DEATH PENALTY? (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds.,
2012).
199. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
200. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995–96 (1991) (upholding
over an Eighth Amendment challenge a mandatory LWOP sentence for the
possession of less than one kilo of cocaine); cf., e.g., Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256,
257 (1974) (upholding the President’s decision to commute a death sentence to
LWOP); Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 485 (1927) (same).
201. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1111; 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 848.

2022]

FOCUSING PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY

73

requires proof that a party acted with “evil intent.” The
Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause does
not prohibit the government from dispensing with such
proof, 202 but it has never ruled that the government may
imprison someone for a strict liability crime. 203 The
President could join the members of the Criminal Law
Scholars Hall of Fame, who condemn strict liability
crimes, 204 by deciding that no one should be imprisoned for
any such offense. If the President were to go further and
conclude that it is unconstitutional to imprison someone for
a strict liability offense, 205 he or she would be duty-bound to
commute any term of incarceration. 206
4. Offenses with a Maximum Term of Imprisonment
The final category would involve a different type of linedrawing exercise. The President could decide that the federal
penal code imposes unduly severe sentences for too many
different types of crimes. The sentences imposed for drug
trafficking are quite lengthy, and they have drawn the most
fire from critics. 207 Nevertheless, the sentences for fraud can
be quite lengthy too. Historically, the maximum sentence for
mail fraud was five years’ imprisonment. 208 After the failure
of several major corporations, such as Enron, due to largescale fraud, Congress upped the maximum penalty to twenty
years. 209 The Sentencing Guidelines recommend a

202. See, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 283–84 (1943);
Larkin, Strict Liability, supra note 100, at 1077–78, 1081 n.55 (collecting cases).
203. Larkin, Strict Liability, supra note 100, at 1102–03 & n.131.
204. Larkin, Pardoning Mistakes, supra note 109, at 656 & n.17 (collecting
authorities).
205. As I have argued. See id. at 663–69.
206. See PRAKASH, supra note 26, at 310.
207. See generally, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 8; BARKOW, supra note 6.
208. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 683, 763 (codified at 18 U.S.C
§§ 1–6001).
209. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and elsewhere at 18, 28 & 29 U.S.C.)).
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sentencing range based on the dollar value of the fraud. 210
The President could believe that the upper ranges for those
offenses are too high. For example, the President could
decide that neither a drug trafficker nor a fraudster should
receive a sentence greater than ten years’ imprisonment
absent some additional aggravating factor, such as the use of
violence to commit the former crime and the offender’s
decision to prey on vulnerable victims in the case of the
latter. The President could also draw numerous other lines
in connection with those crimes, as well as different offenses.
If so, he would be able to implement his decision on a
category-by-category basis. That approach would not
eliminate subjectivity, of course. Where anyone, including a
President, draws the line, while perhaps not entirely
subjective, rests on his personal judgment as to what would
be a reasonable range of years of imprisonment.
That is the best that any President can do. There will
almost never be societal agreement on what precise sentence
an offender should receive. Different people assign different
weights to the role of the harms committed by a crime and
the mental state of the offender, as well as to the various
aggravating and mitigating features of both. Nonetheless,
there is general agreement within society regarding the
ordinal relationship among offenses (murder is more serious
than assault; fraud is worse than trespass; and so forth). 211
Societies also have a general understanding as to what
punishments are unduly lenient and disproportionately

210. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 129, § 2B1.1, at 82–83.
211. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO
SHOULD BE PUNISHED HOW MUCH? 11 (2008) (“[S]ocial science research suggest[s]
that average people, no matter their training or level of education, hold strong
intuitive views of an offender’s blameworthiness for wrongdoing. Indeed, the
studies suggest that an astounding level of agreement across demographics
regarding the relative blameworthiness of different offenders exists, at least with
respect to the core of wrongdoing (physical aggression, taking of property, and
deception in exchanges). Thus, one could adopt a distributive principle of ‘desert’
based on the community’s shared intuitions of justice rather than based on
philosophical notions of desert.”).
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onerous for a particular type of crime. 212 The President could
decide that the Congress and Sentencing Commission set an
upper range that exceeds the purposes of retribution,
incapacitation, deterrence, education, respecting victims’
suffering, and any other relevant purpose of punishment. If
so, the President could commute whatever sentence a
prisoner has received above a chosen limit.
A category-by-category approach avoids the flaws that
confront Presidents like Obama when making commutation
judgments: either the President must delegate case-by-case
decision-making to others, or he must take time away from
his other responsibilities to review each case. Neither option
is a good one.
IV. SHOULD THERE BE AN ADDITIONAL CATEGORY FOR
“EXTRAORDINARY” CASES?
As a practical matter, this question is unnecessary.
There will be a category for “extraordinary” cases whether or
not it can be justified by law or policy. The average person
would certainly find that category useful, if not necessary.
We recognize that rules can be eminently reasonable ways of
managing most of life, but also that there always will be
cases that fall outside of whatever rules we adopt, and we
need to have sufficient flexibility in our judgment-making to
allow for some exceptions. Decision trees and other decisionmaking tools are just that—tools that help someone make the
right decision, not a substitute for reasoned judgment. 213

212. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 25 (2d ed. 2008);
ROBINSON, supra note 208, at 11 (“People do not share a sense of the absolute
amount of punishment that is deserved for an offense. Some tend to be harsher
in their punishment tastes than others. Rather, what people share is a sense of
the relative blameworthiness of different cases.”).
213. Ted Sorensen, Counsel to President John Kennedy, made that general
point nearly six decades ago:
Procedures do, of course, affect decisions. They especially affect which
issues reach the top and which options are presented . . . . But procedures
and machinery do not—or at least they should not—dictate decisions,
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Particularly where the subject is forgiveness or mercy, we
should be willing to recognize that life is too unruly for rules
to govern every scenario. The best explanation of that
phenomenon is one given by former Stanford Law School
Professor Anthony Amsterdam:
Several years ago when I was teaching at Penn, we had our
local version of the grading reform boom that has since swept the
law schools of the nation. Students and some faculty rebelled
against the rigidities and artificialities of the 100-point numerical
grading system then in use. Other faculty members were loath to
abandon it, and challenged the reformers to devise a better scheme.
Some suggested a seven-point scale; some said three grades would
be sufficient; some stood upon the plank that categories ought to be
abandoned entirely, leaving each professor to fill the margins of his
bluebooks with such withering or admiring adjectives as he might
choose.
Finally, some political genius hit upon a solution. One hundred
pairs of adjectives were chosen to replace the 100 numbers of the
100-point grading scale, from “abysmally abominable” for zero to
“celestially sublime” for 100. The system was called the Peachy
Keen Scale because “peachy keen” was the adjectival equivalent for
a 78, which everyone agreed ought to remain the median grade, or
adjective, at the law school. The system was a fireball until several
professors—who had never previously felt unduly confined by the
numerical scale because numbers are recognizably artificial—
complained that the Peachy Keen Scale contained an insufficient
number and quality of adjectives to express their views upon the
infinite variety of student writing.
The motto, I suppose, is that any number of categories,
however shaped, is too few to encompass life and too many to
organize it manageably. 214

While Presidents are not average people (for good or ill),
few are willing to decide that a decision-making tool that
works in the vast majority of cases must be followed in every
case regardless of how it treats extraordinary ones. No
particularly in our highest political office. We may marvel at the speed and
the efficiency with which an electronic computer can solve certain
problems, but we would not vote for that computer to be President.
THEODORE C. SORENSON, DECISION-MAKING
(1963).

IN THE

WHITE HOUSE 3–4 (2005)

214. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN.
L. REV. 349, 376–77 (1974).
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President is likely to abandon his ability to grant clemency
to someone whom he believes is a deserving candidate just
because the approaches set forth above do not result in
“Grant Clemency” as the answer. It is impossible to imagine
a President saying to him- or herself, “I’d like to pardon John
or Jane Doe (or commute his or her sentence) because of some
extraordinary feature of his or her life, but I can’t do so
because the decision-making methodology I’ve approved does
not lead to that result.” If that is impossible to imagine, and
I believe that it is, we do no one a favor by fighting the
eminently natural urge to exercise discretion in
extraordinary cases even when a rule tells us not to do so.
Nor do we want a President to feel bound by whatever
decision-making tool he uses. We want a President to make
reasoned judgments. The schemata discussed above help a
President do that without handcuffing him. The President
needs to make, and to appear to be making, objectively
defensible decisions. He is the nation’s chief executive, not a
priest, a minister, a rabbi, or an imam. A member of the cloth
can forgive even if the congregation would decry his action.
A President cannot; he answers to the public, not the
Almighty (at least in this life), so he cannot weaken the
public’s confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice
system. Yet, he still should not forgive when doing so would
bring the clemency process—and therefore the criminal
justice system—into disrepute. If he does, the public loses
respect for the system and might choose not to help law
enforcement officials do their jobs. Innocent people will
become needless victims.
The problem is two-fold: (1) How do you define an
“extraordinary” case? (2) How do you keep that exception
from swallowing the rule? Neither question has a good
answer. If I knew how to define an “extraordinary” case, I
would have built the decision into the methodology set forth
above. The dictionary is not very useful. It defines
“extraordinary” as beyond what is usual, regular, or
established; not normal; or surpassing the common degree or
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measure, and so forth. 215 That definition, however, is not
helpful. A goodly number of cases could satisfy that
definition; perhaps one-third to just shy of one-half of
clemency applications could meet it. Who knows?
Of course, maybe for that reason “extraordinary” is not
the right word to use for this category. Maybe we need to
approach the reach of this category from a different direction.
Maybe the best way to define the category is to ask whether
a clemency petition “dazzles” the reader. That is, the
applicant is someone whom every reasonable person would
say merits clemency, someone whose desert “just jumps off
the pages” of his application. 216 Want an example of how the
“extraordinary case” exception should work? Here is one.
On October 10, 2019, President Trump issued a
posthumous pardon to Zay Jeffries for his 1948 conviction for
engaging in anticompetitive conduct, in violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act. 217 Jeffries, who died in 1965, was a
scientist, with a specialty in metallurgy. His work on the
Manhattan Project and with development of armor-piercing
shells helped the war effort during World War II. 218 A 2013
215. Extraordinary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
216. See 21 (Columbia Pictures 2008). The film 21 is based on the true story of
the students and graduates of MIT and Harvard who used card-counting
techniques to win at blackjack in Las Vegas casinos. In the film, an MIT senior
admitted to the Harvard Medical School (HMS) is speaking with the HMS
Admissions Director about a prestigious scholarship that would pay for the entire
cost of his education. The director tells the student that there are numerous
others who have applied for that scholarship and that the application essay will
be critical. He then tells the student that the recipient will be someone who
“dazzles. Someone who just jumps off the page.” He asks the student, “What can
you tell me, Ben, that’s going to dazzle me?” Melissa Tsuncova, Did I Dazzle You?
– 21 (2008), YOUTUBE (June 16, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rEYSXx-s-U.
217. Donald J. Trump, Executive Grant of Clemency to Zay Jeffries (Oct. 10,
2019).
218. Trump Pardons Scientist Who Helped Allies Triumph in WWII,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 10, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/ad44481404cd406
69b3bec49b583da80; John Bowden, Trump Grants Posthumous Pardon to
Manhattan Project Contributor, THE HILL (Oct. 10, 2019, 4:54 PM),
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/465290-trump-grants-
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biographical memoir prepared for the National Academy of
Scientists, of which Jeffries was an elected member,
described the circumstances of his conviction as follows:
One of the great satisfactions of Jeffries’ life, but also one of his
great disappointments, was his leadership of the cemented-carbide
tool industry in the United States—a satisfaction because his
executive efforts helped to establish the industry; and a
disappointment because he and two other GE [viz., General Electric
Company] executives were later indicted and found guilty for
violating antitrust and tariff acts in connection with certain
licensing and merchandising practices. As indicated below, they
were convicted for following licensing practices that had been
implicitly approved by a Supreme Court decision in 1928 but
overturned 20 years later when the Supreme Court reversed itself
on those same practices.
In 1925 the General Electric Company sent one of its research
engineers, Samuel L. Hoyt, to Germany to investigate metallurgical
processes of interest to GE. Having been involved in the drawing of
tungsten wires for light filaments, Hoyt had worked with tungsten
carbide as a possible die material. While in Germany he learned of
a process that had been developed at the German company F. Krupp
AG for making cemented tungsten carbide, wherein particles of
tungsten carbide could be embedded in a tough cobalt matrix that
made a superior tool, not only for wire drawing but for machining
as well. On his return to Schenectady, Hoyt worked to duplicate the
process in an effort to make die materials that could be used for wire
drawing in GE’s lamp division. This led to the development of a
cemented-carbide material, which the company called Carboloy.
GE recognized the broad potential value of this material for
machining, but subsequent patent searches determined that the
Germans had already been awarded a patent on an alloy identical
to Carboloy and further that Krupp had acquired the rights to
market that alloy throughout the world. This situation led to
negotiations that allowed GE to market Carboloy in the United
States. By 1928 GE had formed a separate company, Carboloy Co.,
with Zay Jeffries as one of the key executives. He became President
of Carboloy in 1932 and was named chairman of the board in 1936.
The cemented-carbide industry struggled in the years of the
depression and continually fought with Krupp over past business
agreements; Krupp even stopped marketing the product in the
United States. Through a new agreement in 1936, Krupp
surrendered its right to export into the United States in return for
royalty payments based on its remaining patents. Thus by the late
1930s the cemented-carbide tool industry was entirely in American
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hands.
In 1940 Carboloy filed a routine suit against a U.S. company
that Carboloy considered to be infringing on the patents it had
acquired through its agreements with Krupp. Jeffries and others at
Carboloy were surprised, if not shocked, that the federal judge
presiding in the case handed down a decision that all of the patents
that had been granted in the 1920s should not have been granted.
This unbelievable ruling almost certainly was motivated by
international politics—royalties were owed to Krupp, but the judge
concluded that he could not sanction sending money to Hitler’s evil
government. And the way to stop the flow of money was to strike
the patents down, although there was no legitimate legal basis for
doing so.
Because the patents were about to expire anyway, and also
because the company believed that the unanimous Supreme Court
decision from the 1920s was ample protection, Carboloy elected not
to challenge the federal judge’s ruling. Unfortunately, this action
was later interpreted as an admission that Carboloy had been using
licensing and merchandising practices that violated the Sherman
and Wilson Antitrust Acts. Thus a criminal indictment was brought
against Jeffries and others at GE in connection with these antitrust
charges.
When the war began, government officials, including the
Secretary of War, wrote to the Attorney General essentially begging
him not to prosecute because of the need for Jeffries’ expertise in
the war effort. Thus given the intervention of World War II, the case
was not brought to trial until 1947. The defendants were found
guilty on all charges more than a year later, in October of 1948.
Amazingly, the decision of the court was based on a Supreme Court
decision on price-fixing reached earlier in 1948, which completely
reversed the decision of the same court 20 years before. The judge
in the case was so troubled by the new legal requirement that he
saw fit virtually to apologize to Jeffries and the others for having
handed down his decision. In a long statement, the judge pointed to
the great service that Jeffries had provided to the nation in
developing cemented-carbide tools, which played such a key role in
winning the war. 219

219. William D. Nix, Zay Jeffries, 1888–1965: A Biographical Memoir, NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. 9–10 (2013), http://www.nasonline.org/publications/biographicalmemoirs/memoir-pdfs/jeffries-zay.pdf; see also Off. of Comm’ns, The White
House, Statement from the Press Secretary Regarding the Pardon of Zay Jeffries
(Oct. 10, 2019).
One of America’s leading scientists, Dr. Jeffries was crucial to the
United States war effort in World War II. His efforts enabled the United
States to develop artillery shells capable of piercing the armor of German
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The Jeffries’s pardon is striking for a host of reasons. To
start with, the pardon could readily be justified as an effort
to correct a gross injustice because, for all that appears,
Jeffries’s conviction was unconstitutional. A foundational
principle of the criminal law is that the government must
explain to the public where the line is between legal and
illegal conduct before it can claim that someone crossed it. 220
To protect the public against retroactive criminal liability,
the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits Congress from using a
new criminal statute to outlaw past conduct, 221 and the Due
Process Clause keeps federal courts from achieving the same
result by construing an existing statute in an unreasonably
broad and unforeseeable manner. 222 Those principles would
appear to directly apply to Jeffries’s case. The Justice
Department charged him in 1941 with a crime that allegedly
tanks, and his contributions to the Manhattan Project helped end the war
in the Pacific theater.
Although indicted in 1941, Dr. Jeffries proved vital to the war effort
prompting Secretary of War Stimson to take the extraordinary step of
requesting, with President Roosevelt’s approval, that the Attorney General
defer any prosecution until after the war. When the Department of Justice
returned to the case in 1947, it grounded its legal theory on a Supreme
Court precedent that did not exist when Dr. Jeffries was originally indicted.
Reportedly, the judge in the case was apologetic in handing down his
sentence, which was a $2,500 fine with no jail time. In 1948, the same year
as his conviction, President Truman awarded Dr. Jeffries the Presidential
Medal for Merit.
Today, Dr. Jeffries’ case has attracted support from Senator Lindsey
Graham, former Congressman Trey Gowdy, and others. In light of these
facts, and in recognition of his contributions to helping to secure an Allied
victory in the Second World War, the President has concluded that Dr. Zay
Jeffries is worthy of a posthumous pardon.
Id.
220. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2323 (2019) (quoted
supra note 93).
221. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall
be passed.”).
222. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 352 (1964) (quoted supra note
94); see also, e.g., Metrish v. Lancaster, 569 U.S. 351, 356 (2013); Rogers v.
Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 457–62 (2001); Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188,
192 (1977); Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S. 430, 432 (1973); Rabe v. Washington, 405
U.S. 313, 315 (1972).
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had occurred years earlier. That earlier date fixes the
relevant time for purposes of criminal liability. Neither the
Department nor the district court was free to rely on an
interpretation of the law that the Supreme Court did not
adopt until years after the completion of the alleged crime.
That would amount to precisely the type of retroactive
judicial lawmaking that the Supreme Court has
prohibited. 223
Aggravating that error was yet another. If the Supreme
Court had approved in the 1920s the conduct that the
government sought to make a crime in 1941, the district
court should have dismissed the indictment for yet another
reason. Prosecuting someone for conduct that the
government had earlier and expressly said was lawful is not
just retroactive criminal lawmaking but instead playing baitand-switch with the public, which the Supreme Court has
also said the Due Process Clause bars. 224 Accordingly,
President Trump appears to have used his Pardon Clause
authority to correct a clear miscarriage of justice committed
by the Justice Department and the district court.
The Jeffries’s pardon is also justifiable under the
approach discussed above. Jeffries was legally or morally
innocent of the Sherman Act violations charged against him;
that conduct certainly appears to have been an isolated
episode in a law-abiding life; his wartime conduct atoned for
whatever harm he (might have) caused to the economy from
the Sherman Act charge; and granting him a pardon
enhances the integrity of the criminal justice system by
telling the public that the President is willing to correct its

223. I suppose that the Justice Department could argue that retroactive
lawmaking is applying post-1947 decisions like Bouie retroactively to bar the
government from applying the then-most recent Supreme Court interpretations
of the Sherman Act to the conduct charged against Jeffries. That argument would
be clever, but utterly misguided. If it is always reasonable to apply the most
recent judicial interpretations of a pre-existing law, then the department loses.
The Due Process Clause became law in 1791.
224. See cases cited supra note 108.
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mistakes. The decision-making approaches set forth above
would lead to clemency apart from the constitutional
infirmities in his conviction.
Finally, the Jeffries’s pardon is also justifiable as a case
where mercy would be appropriate even if the questions and
categories previously suggested would not lead to relief.
Secretary of War Stimson intervened to ensure that Jeffries
would be available to help in the war effort. Jeffries must
have made an important contribution because President
Harry Truman awarded him the Presidential Medal for
Merit for his work in 1948, the same year that he was
convicted. The district court imposed only a fine and
reportedly was apologetic at sentencing. There is no other
known blemish on his record. Jeffries died more than fifty
years ago, so a pardon cannot lift any of the burdens that a
conviction imposes on someone’s work opportunities or life.
But it does clear his name and perhaps makes a point too—
muted, though it is, by the passage of time—that the Justice
Department should never have charged Jeffries in the first
instance and certainly should never have followed through
with its prosecution once the war ended. Presidential
pardons send a message. From all that appears, the one this
pardon sent is that injustices will be corrected or that mercy
is always available. Either message brings credit on a
President and the office he or she holds.
Cases like Jeffries’s might give us a basis for comparison
when deciding whether a pardon application is dazzling.
That still leaves the second question, however, the one that
asks how we can prevent the exception from swallowing the
rule. Unfortunately, we can’t.
The President has the prerogative to grant clemency to
whomever he decides is due forgiveness or mercy, whenever
he wants to do so, and as often he likes. There is no legal
restraint other than the ones identified in the text of the
Pardon Clause, and there is no judicial review of a decision.
The only external restraints are, at best, political and
historical. The electorate can refuse to re-elect someone who
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cannot be trusted to act responsibly. In an extreme case, the
House of Representatives could impeach the President, and
the Senate could convict and remove a scoundrel from office.
Historians can decry the abuses of presidential power. That,
however, is all that can be done. That result will seem odd to
a public accustomed to watching the federal courts run
virtually every aspect of government, and some others will
deem that outcome utterly unacceptable. As Chief Justice
and former President Taft once wrote, however, the Framers
assumed that Presidents would not abuse their clemency
power. 225 We now know that their assumption was mistaken.
As far as the Constitution goes, however, we have to accept
the bad with the good.
All that said, there is one last question: Suppose
President Biden or a successor were to adopt the approach
set forth in this Article. Would that improve the presidential
decision-making process, or would it simply alert the White
House Communications Office to how it should draft press
statements explaining the President’s decisions? The answer
likely turns on the character of the people we elect as
President. No system—neither the one proposed here nor
any other—can force a President to analyze clemency
petitions rigorously or eliminate the risk of subjective
decisions. We have seen the latter before, 226 and we
225. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 121 (1925).
226. See Sarat, Mercy, supra note 108, at 277 (“Using familiar tropes and
comforting rhetorical appeals, the accounts of their exercise of clemency in capital
cases that governors provide begin to emerge as a genre. The first of their generic
properties has to do with the structural position of clemency as a discretionary
power lodged finally in the office and person of the chief executive. Thus, in each
of these accounts we encounter the governor as a solitary figure wrestling alone
with an enormous responsibility. But executive clemency is not only a personal
discretion, it is a virtually unreviewable power by either the people or the courts.
[¶] This leads to two other generic qualities in these narratives: an effort to
demonstrate the gravity of the decision-making process, and some rhetorical
trope that would ground what is in the end a personal choice in larger cultural
and political values. These generic conventions are addressed to an audience
imagined to be anxious and doubtful about the way the power to spare life is used.
How, then one might ask, do these accounts respond to the pervasive cultural
anxiety that necessarily attaches to a power that cannot be subject to rule? What
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doubtless will see it again. Neither Congress nor the courts
can tell the President whether, when, or how to grant
clemency. Clemency is his prerogative. The approaches
recommended here, I hope, will reduce the risk of mistaken
or improper decision-making. If so, that small improvement
would benefit clemency petitioners, the President, and the
public. Any improvement in that process would be salutary.
CONCLUSION
Most of today’s scholarship focuses on the treatment of
clemency petitions before they reach the President’s desk.
That is valuable, but it is no less important to offer the
President guidance on how to treat them once they are in his
or her hands. Clemency requests can tax the wisdom and
compassion of a member of the clergy or a philosopher.
Perhaps Abraham Lincoln had the wisdom needed to resolve
clemency applications without any guidance like what I have
recommended here. But we have not elected a Lincoln in
quite some time, so we need to offer the people we do choose
a way to act responsibly and humanely. This Article tries to
do just that.

rhetorical and literary strategies do they employ? Can, and do, these narratives
provide consolation and calm that anxiety?”).

